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Note
The Insurer's Duty to Defend: New York
Folds the Four Corners of the Complaint
Rule in Fitzpatrick v. American Honda
Motor Co.
I. Introduction
The insurer's duty to defend its insured has been the sub-
ject of legal controversy for many years.1 This controversy is
destined to continue as the expense of defending claims contin-
ues to rise.2 In a standard liability policy, also known as a "dual
promise" policy,' an insurer is obligated to defend its insured
1. The insurer's duty to defend issue has resulted in considerable commentary: See,
e.g., Andrew Janquitto, Insurer's Duty To Defend in Maryland, 18 U. BALT. L. REV. 1
(1988); David S. Garbett, The Duty To Defend Clause in a Liability Insurance Policy;
Should the Exclusive Pleading Test Be Replaced?, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 235 (1982). This
issue has also arisen within extensive case law in New York State. See, e.g., Lee v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 178 F.2d 750, 751 (2d Cir. 1949) (applying New York law, Judge Learned
Hand stated "it is the claim which determines the insurer's duty to defend"); A. Meyers
& Sons Corp. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Group, 74 N.Y.2d 298, 545 N.E.2d 1206, 546 N.Y.S.2d
818 (1989); Ruder & Finn Inc. v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 52 N.Y.2d 663, 422 N.E.2d 518, 439
N.Y.S.2d 858 (1981); International Paper Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 35 N.Y.2d 322, 320
N.E.2d 619, 361 N.Y.S.2d 873 (1974); Goldberg v. Lumber Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 297 N.Y.
148, 77 N.E.2d 131 (1948).
2. See INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, INC., LEGAL DEFENSE: A LARGE AND GROWING IN-
SURANCE COST (1989). Insurer's legal defense costs rose an average of 16% per year dur-
ing the period 1978-1988. Id. at 4. Insurers incurred legal defense costs of 11.8 billion
dollars in 1988, up from 2.8 billion in 1978, an increase of 320%. Id.
3. The "dual-promise" policy consists of two promises: the promise to defend and
the promise to indemnify. See Raoul D. Kennedy, The Duty To Defend, in INSURER VS.
INSURER DISPUTES 1990, at 25, 27 (PLI Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 534, 1990).
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against third-party claims alleging liability within the policy's
coverage. Therefore, the standard liability policy provides both
indemnity and "litigation" insurance.5
Insurance is an integral component of society that leaves
virtually no person untouched. Justice Black wrote in United
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association:" "Perhaps
no modern commercial enterprise directly affects so many per-
sons in all walks of life as does the insurance business. Insurance
touches the home, the family, and the occupation or the busi-
ness of almost every person in the United States."' In 1990,
property/casualty insurers wrote8 over 217 billion dollars in pre-
miums nationwide.9 Of these premiums,. 18 billion dollars worth
were written by 205 property/casualty insurers with home offices
in New York State.10 The insurance industry has been labeled as
one of the most important in this country and may be the single
largest purchaser of legal services."
4. Ruder & Finn, 52 N.Y.2d at 670, 422 N.E.2d at 521, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 861.
5. International Paper, 35 N.Y.2d at 326, 320 N.E.2d at 621, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 876.
6. 322 U.S. 533 (1944). In South-Eastern Underwriters Association, one of the most
important cases in insurance history, it was held that insurance transactions were subject
to federal regulation under the Commerce Clause, thereby removing the constitutional
impediment to federal regulation of the insurance industry. Id.
7. Id. at 540.
8. Insurance is written by "underwriters" who technically can be the insurance com-
pany or a company employee. FREDERICK G. CRANE, INSURANCE PRINCIPLES & PRACTICES
401 (1980). Underwriting is the process of determining what risks to accept and how to
insure them. Id. The word "underwriting" has an interesting origin in that it evolved
from a seventeenth century practice:
The word "underwriter" originated at Lloyd's. In the late 1600s, a man named
Edward Lloyd ran a coffeehouse in London. Lloyd's coffeehouse came to be known
as a place where shipowners could go to find men interested in insuring ships and
cargoes. The shipowners would go from table to table at the coffeehouse and vari-
ous men would agree to insure part of the shipowners' risks. They did so by writ-
ing their names underneath a description of the risks being insured. (Thus, they
were "underwriting" the risks). Sometimes an underwriter would add the names
of friends who didn't have time to go the coffeehouse themselves but who wanted
to invest some of their funds in the hope of earning a profit. These "names" would
have given the underwriter permission to accept risks on their behalf. The busi-
ness is conducted in essentially the same way today [as Lloyd's of London].
Id. at 428.
9. Telephone Interview with Nancy Williamson, Insurance Information Institute
(Feb. 10, 1992).
10. Id.
11. ROBERT F. CUSHMAN ET AL., PROSECUTING AND DEFENDING INSURANCE CLAIMS v
(1989).
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Along with the insurance industry's growth there has been
an explosion in civil lawsuits filed12 and an increase in costs of
defense.'" The Insurance Services Office'4 has estimated that in
1988, insurers spent about 33 cents on legal defense costs for
every dollar spent on indemnity.15 Accordingly, the duty to de-
fend aspect of the standard liability insurance policy has become
a matter of substantial concern for both insurers and insureds. 6
This Note will examine the insurer's duty to defend in New
York in light of a recent decision by the New York Court of Ap-
peals. In Fitzpatrick v. American Honda Motor Co., 17 the court,
in a 5-4 decision, abandoned the well established "four corners
of the complaint" rule'" used to determine when an insurer has a
duty to defend.' The court held that a rigid application of the
four corners of the complaint rule "exalts form over sub-
stance,' '20 and then pronounced the new rule: "[An insurer must]
provide a defense where, notwithstanding the complaint allega-
tions, underlying facts made known to the insurer create a 'rea-
sonable possibility that the insured may be held liable for some
act or omission covered by the policy.' "21
Part II of this Note explores the source, nature, and scope
of the duty to defend as it existed pre-Fitzpatrick. Also included
12. See INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, 1987-88 PROPERTY/CASUALTY FACT BOOK
8 (1988). The number of civil cases filed in federal courts has skyrocketed over the last
decade and a half from 87,300 in 1970 to 254,800 in 1986. Id.
13. See INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, supra note 2, at 4.
14. The Insurance Services Office is an insurance industry supported statistical and
advisory rating organization that prepares advisory policies for the insurance industry.
James K. Killelea, Format of Liability Insurance Policies, in INTRODUCTION To BUSINESS
INSURANCE, at 229, 277 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 296,
1985).
15. See INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, supra note 2, at 7. This figure applies to general
liability defense costs. Id.
16. ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. W ISS, INSURANCE LAW § 9.1(a), at 987 (1988).
17. 78 N.Y.2d 61, 575 N.E.2d 90, 571 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1991).
18. Although this rule is known by several different names, this name will be used
because it is the name used for the rule in Fitzpatrick. The descriptive name for the rule
means that an insurer may only use the facts as alleged within the four corners of the
complaint to determine whether it has a duty to defend. See infra notes 49-50 and ac-
companying text.
19. Fitzpatrick, 78 N.Y.2d at 70, 575 N.E.2d at 95, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 677.
20. Id.
21. Id. (quoting A. Meyers & Sons Corp. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Group, 74 N.Y.2d 298,
302, 545 N.E.2d 1206, 1208, 546 N.Y.S.2d 818, 820 (1989)).
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in this section is a discussion of the standard procedure used
when an insured requests his contracted-for defense, the role of
the four corners of the complaint rule as it previously existed,
and the unique situation of the non-duty to defend policy. The
Fitzpatrick procedural history and facts along with the underly-
ing reasoning of the majority and dissenting opinions are set
forth in Part III. Part IV examines the implications of Fitzpat-
rick and recommends an extrinsic fact documentation require-
ment that courts should adopt in applying the new rule.
II. Background
A. The Insurer's Duty To Defend
1. The Source of the Duty To Defend
No duty to defend exists on the part of an insurer at com-
mon law; the duty instead flows from the insurance policy as a
contractual obligation undertaken by the insurer.2 A standard
insurance policy contains two distinct, primary duties: (1) the
duty to indemnify the insured, and (2) the duty to defend the
ipsured. s Therefore, it is well established that a standard liabil-
22. See ROBERT H. JERRY, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 561 (1987). The language
of the insurance policy gives rise to the contractual obligation of the insurer to defend
the insured. Id. Once the policy is agreed upon and signed, the contract is formed and
reciprocal rights and duties come into existence. Id. at 563. However, as with most con-
tractual duties, the insurer's duty to defend is not unlimited and is only triggered by
claims that fall within coverage afforded by the policy. Id.
23. See id. at 561. For purposes of this discussion, the standard liability insurance
policy referred to will be a Comprehensive General Liability (CGL) policy. The CGL
policy also accurately reflects the duty to defend provision as it existed in the insurance
policy in Fitzpatrick. The CGL policy is a standard policy form written by the Insurance
Services Office, Inc. (ISO). The typical CGL policy provides:
The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall
become legally obligated to pay as damages because of
Coverage A. bodily injury or
Coverage B. property damage
to which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence, and the company shall
have the right and duty to defend any suit against the insured seeking damages on
account of such bodily injury or property damage, even if any of the allegations of
the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent, and may make such investigation and
settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedient, but the company shall not
be obligated to pay any claim or judgment or to defend any suit after the applica-
ble limit of the company's liability has been exhausted by payment of judgments
or settlements.
7C JOHN A. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4682, at 22 n.9 (1979).
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ity insurance policy provides not only indemnity insurance to
pay "all sums for which the insured shall become legally obli-
gated to pay as damages, '24 but also "litigation insurance ' 25 to
pay for all legal defense costs.
Because the standard liability policy is a contract, certain
legal requirements must be met. 26 Once the parties form the
contract, certain rights and obligations come into existence.27
The classic contract formation model envisions parties with
equal bargaining power and an informed negotiation process
throughout the offer and acceptance stage. 8 Insurance contract
formation, however, is in many ways far removed from this clas-
sic model. Most insurance policies are standard form contracts29
judicially classified as adhesion contracts."0 These contracts have
historically been reviewed with a heightened judicial scrutiny to
protect the consumer.8 1
24. APPLEMAN, supra note 23, § 4682, at 22 n.9.
25. International Paper Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 35 N.Y.2d 322, 326, 320 N.E.2d
619, 621, 361 N.Y.S.2d 873, 876 (1974).
26. To create a valid contract enforceable at law, the parties must (1) make a mani-
festation of mutual assent through offer and acceptance, (2) provide consideration to
support the promises, (3) possess capacity to contract, (4) satisfy the applicable writing
requirement, and (5) contract for a purpose that is not contrary to public policy. JERRY,
supra note 22, at 131.
27. For example, the insurer is obligated to defend and indemnify the insured for
liability arising out of any covered event under the policy and the insured is required to
pay premiums, give the insurer notice of covered events and cooperate with the insurer
in relation to defense of actions. See generally ALLAN D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND
DISPUTES §§ 3.01-3.12 (2d ed. 1988).
28. JERRY, supra note 22, at 138.
29. Standard form contracts have several advantages: (1) they allow the consumer to
price shop by comparing different insurance company premium rates for the same con-
tract type; (2) they are an industry time saver by making individual negotiation unneces-
sary; (3) they allow the industry to evaluate the risks insured more predictably; and (4)
they allow for judicial interpretation of one contract to serve as a guide for the interpre-
tation of all the contracts written in that standard form, which directly promotes judicial
economy. Id. at 145.
30. A contract of adhesion exists where the insured did not have any opportunity to
participate in the drafting of the contract, as with standard form contracts, and thus the
insured does not have any choice but to adhere to the contract. See ROBERT RIEGEL,
INSURANCE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 37 (6th ed. 1976). As a result of insurance con-
tracts being deemed adhesion contracts, the courts often invoke the doctrines of waiver,
estoppel, reformation, and rescission to protect the insured, which in effect create rights
for the insured where none existed in the language of the policy. JERRY, supra note 22, at
105.
31. JERRY, supra note 22, at 146.
1993]
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Standard liability form contracts are widely used, and each
policy type is tailored to meet the needs of insuring a specific
risk or set of risks. The Comprehensive General Liability Policy
(CGL) is designed to cover the insured against a broad range of
liabilities 2 and consequently itcovers damages sustained by any
claimant caused by an insured occurrence.33 Under the CGL
Policy, the duty to defend is expansive because it is broadened
in proportion to the duty to indemnify.3 4 In contrast to the
CGL, two examples of narrowly tailored liability policies are the
Owners' and Contractors' Protective Insurance Policy3" and the
Manufacturers' and Contractors' Liability Policy. 6
The Owners' and Contractors' Protective Insurance Policy
is designed to cover the insured's liability arising out of opera-
tions performed for the insured by independent contractors, and
for liability arising from negligent supervision of the contractor
by the insured in connection with such operations.3 7 A primary
reason for purchasing this type of policy is the duty to defend
provision, that benefits the insured owner or general contractor
when named as a co-defendant in a lawsuit brought for the neg-
ligent acts of a hired independent contractor. 8
The Manufacturers' and Contractors' Liability Policy is
designed to cover the liability insurance needs of a manufacturer
or contractor arising out of all business operations as well as the
ownership, maintenance, or use of premises.3s This policy type
excludes liability coverage for independent contractors employed
by the insured. Consequently, under this type of policy, the duty
to defend provision is inapplicable for liability arising out of the
32. This type of policy arose out of the defects of the separate policy system that
previously existed where the insured had to take out a policy for different types of risks
such as automobile liability, premises liability, products liability, etc. See RIEGEL, supra
note 30, at 443-44.
33. The CGL is subject only to the specific exclusions set forth in the policy. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 442-43.
36. Id. at 439-40.
37. Id. at 443. This policy type is also known as Independent Contractors' Insur-
ance. Id. at 442.
38. Id. at 443.
39. Id. at 439. A description of the insured's business operations is inserted (listed)
in the policy and the premium is based on the payroll, territory, policy limits and exclu-
sions, and the nature of the business operation. Id.
[Vol. 13:141
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use of an independent contractor.40 Therefore, a fundamental
principle is that there is a direct relationship between the duty
to indemnify and the duty to defend."
2. The Nature of the Duty To Defend
The insurer's duty to defend as established by the standard
liability insurance policy provision obligates the insurer to de-
fend the insured and at the same time creates a right in the in-
surer to exclusive control of the defense.42 The exclusive control
element is viewed as necessary from a policy standpoint because
large sums of money are involved. 43 Because insurance premi-
ums are regarded as a "tax on society,"4 4 the insurer's exclusive
control has been deemed necessary to minimize unwarranted
claims and to ensure an orderly and proper disbursement of
funds."3
The existence of specific provisions in the standard liability
policy obligating an insurer to defend the insured has led to the
corollary that the liability policy generally known as indemnity
insurance is "litigation insurance" as well.46 An insurer is obli-
gated to defend the insured if the facts in the complaint against
the insured "raise a reasonable possibility that the insured
may be held liable for some act or omission covered by the
policy .... '" This well established rule is the source of the four
40. Id.
41. See supra text accompanying notes 32-40.
42. See KEETON, supra note 16 § 9.1(b), at 988. See also Feliberty v. Damon, 72
N.Y.2d 112, 527 N.E.2d 261, 531 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1988) (holding that an insurer has an
absolute right to control the defense of the insured including the right to settle without
seeking the advice of the insured, provided that the settlement is within the policy
limits).
43. APPLEMAN, supra note 23, § 4681, at 2.
44. Id.
45. Id. See also Parker v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 109 Misc. 2d 678, 681, 440 N.Y.S.2d
964, 967 (Sup. Ct. 1981) ("Giving the insurer exclusive control over litigation against the
insured safeguards the orderly and proper disbursement of the large sums of money in-
volved in the insurance business.").
46. Seaboard Sur. Co. v. Gillette Co., 64 N.Y.2d 304, 310, 476 N.E.2d 272, 275, 486
N.Y.S.2d 873, 876 (1984) ("Though policy coverage is often denominated as 'liability
insurance', where the insurer has made promises to defend 'it is clear that [the coverage]
is, in fact, "litigation insurance" as well.' "); International Paper Co. v. Continental Cas.
Co., 35 N.Y.2d 322, 326, 320 N.E.2d 619, 621, 361 N.Y.S.2d 873, 876 (1974).
47. A. Meyers & Sons Corp. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Group, 74 N.Y.2d 298, 302, 545
N.E.2d 1206, 1208, 546 N.Y.S.2d 818, 820 (1989). See also APPLEMAN, supra note 23, §
1993]
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corners of the complaint rule.48
3. Scope of the Duty to Defend
. a. Allegations in the Complaint
Under the four corners of the complaint rule, the insurer is
often obligated to defend but not to indemnify the insured.4 9
This inconsistency results from the practical reality of when and
how the two duties are determined. The duty to defend is deter-
mined at the outset of the action and is conditioned on potential
coverage under the policy, while the duty to indemnify is deter-
mined at the conclusion of the action and is conditioned on legal
liability.50
The courts have developed rules to guide the insurer in de-
termining whether the duty to defend exists when the allega-
tions of the complaint are compared against the provisions of
the insured's policy.5 1 First, the duty to defend is conditioned on
the possibility of recovery under the policy, not on the
probability of recovery.2 This rule, by its very nature, broadens
the reach of the duty to defend beyond that of the duty to in-
demnify. Second, if the insurer has a duty to defend with regard
to any aspect of the lawsuit, it has a duty to defend every aspect
4683, at 50. The insurer's duty to defend is measured by the allegations in the pleadings;
the complaint is compared to the policy to determine if the duty to defend is triggered.
Id.
48. Other state courts have adopted a very broad rule, the reasonable expectations
rule, that obligates an insurer to defend whenever the insured had a reasonable expecta-
tion of coverage based on the language of the policy and the allegations of the complaint.
See, e.g., Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1966); City of Willoughby Hills v.
Cincinnati Ins. Co., 459 N.E.2d 555 (Ohio 1984).
49. See, e.g., Colon v. Aetna Life and Cas. Ins. Co., 66 N.Y.2d 6, 484 N.E.2d 1040,
494 N.Y.S.2d 688 (1985) (holding that the insurer had a duty to defend the insured
owner of a vehicle as well as the driver in a personal injury action where the complaint
alleged that the driver had the permission of the owner but the jury ultimately con-
cluded at trial that the driver did not have permission, thus failing to give rise to an
insurance covered event requiring indemnification).
50. JERRY, supra note 22, at 562.
51. See infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
52. George Muhlstock & Co. v. American Home Ass'n Co., 117 A.D.2d 117, 502
N.Y.S.2d 174 (1st Dep't 1986). The court stated: "The test is not the ultimate proof of
the allegations but rather whether sufficient facts are stated so as to invoke coverage
under the policy. The duty to defend arises not from the probability of recovery but
from its possibility, no matter how remote." Id. at 122, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 178.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol13/iss1/5
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of the lawsuit.53 Third, when the allegations in the complaint are
ambiguous and do not clearly state a claim that is within cover-
age of the policy, all doubts are resolved in favor of the insured
resulting in the insurer having a duty to defend .5  Accordingly,
an insurer cannot rely on poor complaint drafting to avoid its
contractual obligation to defend.5 Fourth, in construing insur-
ance policy provisions, courts will resolve any ambiguities in pol-
icy wording in favor of the insured.5
Pursuant to these judicially developed rules, the duty of an
insurer to defend is broader than its duty to indemnify.5 7 How-
ever, the insurer's duty to defend is not without limits. For ex-
ample, the insurer's duty to defend may terminate if the insured
has breached some provision of the policy that is unrelated to
the allegations of the complaint or the established facts in the
53. See Ruder & Finn Inc. v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 52 N.Y.2d 663, 669-70, 422 N.E.2d
518, 521, 439 N.Y.S.2d 858, 861 (1981) (holding that the duty to defend "includes the
defense of those actions in which alternative grounds are asserted, even if some are with-
out the protection purchased").
54. See International Paper Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 35 N.Y.2d 322, 320 N.E.2d
619, 361 N.Y.S.2d 873 (1974) (holding that although complaint allegations in a personal
injury action against insured could be interpreted to refer to an occurrence that (1) took
place away from the work premises and (2) that was not within the scope of the insured's
employment, which would place the occurrence within a policy exclusion, the insurer was
not relieved of its duty to defend absent a demonstration that the allegations were solely
and entirely within the policy exclusions). See generally JERRY, supra note 22, at 566.
55. Ruder & Finn, 52 N.Y.2d at 670, 422 N.E.2d at 521, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 861. The.
court held that:
[A] policy protects against poorly or incompletely pleaded cases as well as those
artfully drafted. Thus the question is not whether the complaint can withstand a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. Nor is the insured's ulti-
mate liability a consideration. If, liberally construed, the claim is within the em-
brace of the policy, the insurer must come forward to defend its insured no matter
how groundless, false or baseless the suit may be.
Id. See also Commercial Pipe & Supply Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 36 A.D.2d 412, 414-15,
321 N.Y.S.2d 219, 221 (4th Dep't 1971), aff'd, 30 N.Y.2d 619, 282 N.E.2d 128, 331
N.Y.S.2d 42 (1972) (holding that the insurer had the duty to defend where the insurance
policy covered the unloading of tractor-trailers even when the complaint only alleged
that the injury was sustained by cutting wire around a bundle of steel pipes because "it
may fairly and reasonably be inferred from the language" that the tractor-trailer was
being unloaded).
56. Ruder & Finn, 52 N.Y.2d at 671, 422 N.E.2d at 522, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 862 (stating
the general rule pertaining to insurance policies "that all ambiguities to the meaning of a
policy must be resolved in favor of the insured").
57. Id. at 669, 422 N.E.2d at 521, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 861; Goldberg v. Lumber Mut.
Cas. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 297 N.Y. 148, 154, 77 N.E.2d 131, 133 (1948).
1993]
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lawsuit." In such a situation, although the duty to defend would
attach by virtue of the allegations in the complaint, the duty
would cease upon the insurer having proved the type of breach
that excuses its duty to indemnify.59
The duty to defend may also terminate when the insurer
undertakes the defense of an ambiguous claim and it later be-
comes clear that no coverage exists.6 0 The insurer would be enti-
tled to withdraw from the defense as long as the insured would
not be prejudiced." This same principle applies to the situation
where the claim in the complaint that gave rise to the insurer's
duty to defend is subsequently removed from the lawsuit.0 2
The insurer's duty to defend may also be terminated when
the insurer establishes that the allegations in the complaint fall
within a policy exclusion.6 3 In this situation, the insurer cannot
rely on the complaint to refuse coverage, but rather must make
an affirmative showing that the allegations in the complaint rest
"solely and entirely within the policy exclusion, and ... are sub-
ject to no other interpretation. '64 Therefore, the insurer will
only be excused from defending the insured when, in a declara-
tory judgment action, the court can conclude as a matter of law
that the insurer will not be obligated to indemnify the insured. 5
58. Robert A. Zeavin et al., How To Handle a Coverage Dispute; in INTRODUCTION
To BUSINESS INS. LAW AND LITIG. 1985, at 635, 651 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 296, 1985). Examples of this type of breach include "untimely no-
tice, non-payment of premium, discrepancy between the insured named in the policy and
the defendant named in the lawsuit, etc." Id.
59. Id.
60. See Lee v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 178 F.2d 750, 753 (2d Cir. 1949) (The rule
stated by Judge Hand was "[i]f the plaintiff's complaint against the insured alleged facts
which would have supported a recovery covered by the policy, it was the duty of the
[insurer] to undertake the defence, until it could confine the claim to a recovery that the
policy did not cover.").
61. Id. See generally JERRY, supra note 22, at 570.
62. Lee, 178 F.2d at 753; Barry R. Ostrager et al., The Insurer's Duty To Defend, in
INSURANCE EXCESS, AND REINSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES 1988, at 13, 38-39 (PLI Litig. &
Admin. Course Handbook Series No. 343, 1988) (stating that "this limitation on the in-
surer's duty is widely acknowledged").
63. See Seaboard Sur. Co. v. Gillette Co., 64 N.Y.2d 304, 312, 476 N.E.2d 272, 275,
486 N.Y.S.2d 873, 876 (1984).
64. Technicon Elecs. Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 74 N.Y.2d 66, 73-74,
542 N.E.2d 1048, 1050, 544 N.Y.S.2d 531, 533 (1989) (quoting International Paper Co. v.
Continental Ins. Co., 35 N.Y.2d 322, 325, 320 N.E.2d 619, 621, 361 N.Y.S.2d 873, 875
(1974)).
65. Villa Charlotte Bronte, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 64 N.Y.2d 846, 848,
[Vol. 13:141
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The uncertainty of whether the insurer has the duty to de-
fend is in large part due to the modern pleading rules that do
not mandate the specificity previously required. 6 The facts set
forth in the pleadings are often insufficient to enable the insurer
to make a sound determination of whether the duty to defend
exists.6 7 To refuse the insured an insurer-provided defense at the
inception of the lawsuit would render the duty to defend provi-
sion in the policy meaningless.18 Therefore, the courts have de-
veloped the liberal rules previously discussed to protect the in-
sured from being denied the contractual right to a defense that
would otherwise be unenforceable. 9 As previously noted, how-
ever, the insurer can take steps to relieve itself of the duty to
defend under certain circumstances.7
b. Extrinsic Facts
i. New York
The New York courts have also developed rules pertaining
to information extrinsic to the complaint that further broaden
the insurer's duty to defend. The first rule involves the scenario
where the complaint alleges facts sufficient to support a possibil-
ity of coverage under the policy, but the insurer knows of facts
not mentioned in the complaint that negate its duty to indem-
nify.7 1 In this situation, the insurer is bound by the allegations
within the four corners of the complaint and cannot refuse to
476 N.E.2d 640, 641, 487 N.Y.S.2d 314, 315 (1985); Hanover Ins. Co. v. Sage, 123 A.D.2d
602, 506 N.Y.S.2d 769 (2d Dep't 1986) (holding that insurer could not be excused from
defending insured in a defamation action where there was a factual issue as to whether
the defamation claim fell under a policy exclusion because it could not be concluded as a
matter of law that there was no possible factual or legal basis on which insurer might
eventually be held obligated to indemnify). See also APPLEMAN, supra note 23, § 4684.01,
at 18 (Supp. 1991).
66. See APPL.MAN, supra note 23, § 4684, at 83.
67. Id.
68. Id. To require the insured to prove the insurer's obligation to defend would be
"a return to the old indemnity contracts .... "Id. The author is apparently referring to
the type of insurance contracts that were known as single promise policies that only
provided for indemnity after the insured has suffered a loss covered by the policy, pre-
sumably after judgment or settlement. See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 27.
69. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
71. See JERRY, supra note 22, at 565.
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defend based on independently obtained information that dem-
onstrates that the claim is in fact not covered. 72 This rule ap-
plies even if the information was obtained directly from the
insured.7
The second rule involves the scenario where the allegations
in the complaint do not give rise to a duty to defend, but the
insurer possesses information that indicates that coverage may
exist. There is a paucity of case law in New York involving this
situation. 74 However, two frequently cited cases hold that the in-
surer must consider facts outside of the complaint that "may
fairly and reasonably be inferred from the language [of the com-
plaint] '7 5 and must "be guided, not exclusively by the allega-
tions of the complaint, but also by the facts known to it."
76
In Commercial Pipe & Supply Corp. v. Allstate Insurance
Co., 7 7 Commercial Pipe sought to recover its expenses incurred
while defending a personal injury action. In the personal injury
action, the plaintiff was the driver and owner of a tractor-trailer
that he leased to Schreiber Trucking Corporation.7 8 The driver/
72. Lee v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 178 F.2d 750, 750 (2d Cir. 1949). Judge Hand
stated specifically that "it is the claim which determines the insurer's duty to defend;
and it is irrelevant that the insurer may get information from the insured, or from any-
one else, which indicates, or even demonstrates, that the injury is not in fact 'covered.'"
Id. at 751. See also Zurich Am. Ins. Cos. v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Cos., 74 N.Y.2d 621, 539
N.E.2d 1098, 541 N.Y.S.2d 970 (1989) (holding that even though the defendants stated
in their answers that they were not covered employees under the policy, the insurer
could not use these answers to refuse coverage); Green Bus Lines v. Consolidated Mut.
Ins. Co., 74 A.D.2d 136, 144-45, 426 N.Y.S.2d 981, 987 (2d Dep't 1980) (stating that
where the insurer is "in possession of certain proof ... it may not ... [use it to] resolve
ambiguities in the ... complaint . . ").
73. Kinkaid v. Simmons, 66 A.D.2d 428, 414 N.Y.S.2d 407 (1st Dep't 1979) (holding
that insurer had duty to defend despite insured's admission that the accident occurred
after completion of work that placed the accident within the completed hazard exclusion
because the complaint alleged that the accident occurred prior to completion).
74. Other jurisdictions have more developed case law in this area. See infra notes
98-112 and accompanying text.
75. Commercial Pipe & Supply Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 36 A.D.2d 412, 415, 321
N.Y.S.2d 219, 221 (4th Dep't 1971).
76. Sucrest Corp. v. Fisher Governor Co., 83 Misc. 2d 394, 403, 371 N.Y.S.2d 927,
937 (Sup. Ct. 1975). There are cases in New York that cite Commercial Pipe and
Sucrest, purporting to consider extrinsic information in determining the duty to defend,
but which ultimately make a determination based simply on the potentiality of the alle-
gations in the complaint rather than on consideration of extrinsic information. See, e.g.,
Ogden Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 681 F. Supp. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
77. 36 A.D.2d 412, 321 N.Y.S.2d 219 (4th Dep't 1971).
78. Id. at 413, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 220.
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owner was injured while unloading steel pipe that was intended
for delivery to Commercial Pipe.79 The driver/owner brought
suit against Commercial Pipe alleging that its employees negli-
gently cut a wire around a bundle of steel pipes causing them to
become loose and injure him. 0 Commercial Pipe claimed that it
was a named insured under the automobile policy that Schreiber
Trucking Corporation held with Allstate. 81 The policy provided
that "also included as an insured [are] any person[s] [] using an
owned or hired automobile.., provided that such use includes
the loading and unloading thereof."82 Upon receiving the com-
plaint, Commercial Pipe tendered it to Allstate with a letter
stating that because the accident occurred while unloading the
tractor-trailer, it was an additional insured under Schreiber's
policy and therefore, entitled to a defense.83
Allstate refused to defend, basing its refusal on the fact that
the complaint stated only that the injury was "caused by negli-
gence of [Commercial Pipe's] employees in cutting wire around a
bundle of steel pipes. '84 The court held that Allstate had a duty
to defend because, although the complaint did not specifically
state that the incident occurred while unloading, "it may fairly
and reasonably be inferred from the language [of the com-
plaint]" that the injury occurred during unloading. 5 The court
further stated that "the language of the complaint need not
state all the facts requisite to establish insurance coverage," but
only facts sufficient to bring the claim within the potential cov-
erage of the policy.88
79. Id. Although the shipment was intended for delivery to Commercial Pipe, it was
mistakenly delivered next door to Acme Nipple Manufacturing Company whose employ-
ees helped unload the steel pipe. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 414, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 221.
85. Id. at 415, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 221.
86. Id. This case appears to provide only tenuous support for the rule that the citing
cases use it for - that information extrinsic to the complaint must be used to deter-
mine the insurer's duty to defend. The court here allowed a logical inference from the
facts alleged in the complaint that brought the claim potentially within the coverage of
the policy - that the cutting of the wire around the bundle of pipes in connection with
the defendants delivering those pipes to the plaintiff necessarily involved the unloading
of the pipes. This logical inference is far removed from inferring, for instance, that a
19931
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In the second frequently cited case, Sucrest Corp. v. Fisher
Governor Co.,87 Fisher, as a fourth-party plaintiff, sought a de-
claratory judgment that a CGL policy issued by Liberty Mutual
Insurance Company (Liberty) to Scovill Manufacturing Com-
pany (Scovill) "afforded coverage to Fisher under a vendor's or
product's liability endorsement to the policy." 88 The complaint
allegations in the underlying action charged Fisher with negli-
gence in connection with the manufacture, distribution and sale
of a special shut-off valve that allegedly caused a fire at
Sucrest's refinery.8 9 After receipt of the complaint, Fisher com-
menced a third-party action against Scovill for indemnity,
charging that any damages it might be liable for were caused by
the negligence of Scovill because it had sold the valve to
Fisher.90
Scovill's CGL policy contained a vendor's or product's lia-
bility endorsement extending coverage "to any person or organi-
zation with respect to the distribution or sale in the course of
business of any merchandise or product manufactured, sold,
handled or distributed by the named insured."91 Fisher claimed
it was an additional insured under Scovill's endorsement policy
and sought to recover the defense costs that it had incurred in
the underlying action.9 2 Liberty refused to defend Fisher, assert-
ing that the allegations in the original complaint were insuffi-
cient to invoke coverage for Fisher. Liberty further stated that
neither the original complaint nor the supplemental complaint
served on Fisher named Scovill as a defendant.9 "
The court held that Liberty did have a duty to defend
Fisher, but only after Liberty was put on notice of its liability,
third-party not mentioned in the pleading had performed the act. See also infra text
accompanying notes 305-07.
87. 83 Misc. 2d 394, 371 N.Y.S.2d 927 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
88. Id. at 396, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 931-32. Fisher claimed that Liberty had the duty to
indemnify it for the settlement that it made with Sucrest in the main action prior to
instituting this action. Id., 371 N.Y.S.2d at 932.
89. Id. at 397, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 932.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 398, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 933.
92. Id. at 396, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 932. In addition, Fisher sought recovery for the de-.
fense costs it incurred in prosecuting the declaratory judgment action which was denied
by the court. Id. See infra notes 171-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of when
attorney's fees are recoverable in breach of duty to defend situations.
93. Id. at 401, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 936.
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that is, when Fisher served the third-party complaint on its
named insured, Scovill.94 The court stated that Liberty should
have examined both the supplemental complaint served on
Fisher and the third-party complaint against its insured to de-
termine whether it had a duty to defend Fisher as an additional
insured in the original action.9 5 The court held that because the
allegations in the third-party complaint were sufficient to raise
the possibility that Fisher would be covered under the endorse-
ment to Scovill's policy, it had a duty to defend Fisher from that
time forward."' In conclusion, the court held that "where the
complaint alleges facts without the coverage of the policy, but
the carrier [insurer] has knowledge of facts indicating coverage,
the insurer is to be guided, not exclusively by the allegations of
the complaint, but also by the facts known to it." 97
ii. Other Jurisdictions
The consideration of extrinsic information in the duty to
defend determination has been accepted in many jurisdictions.98
These jurisdictions have expanded or modified the four corners
of the complaint rule to include consideration of facts not con-
tained in the complaint.99 The modifications of the rule fall into
two basic categories. The first category only requires considera-
tion of facts "actually known" by the insurer. 100 The second re-
quires consideration of those extrinsic facts that are known or
94. Id.
95. Id. at 401-02, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 936.
96. Id. However, in its final decision the court only obligated Liberty to pay the
defense costs from the date it formally refused to defend Fisher, March 16, 1973, one
month after service of the third-party complaint. Id. at 408, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 942. The
court also held that Liberty was under a duty to indemnify Fisher for the settlement
that it had made with Sucrest in the underlying action of $265,000. Id.
97. Id. at 403, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 937. The court here seems to be stating that the
insurer must also look at facts in other "complaints" to determine the duty to defend. It
is not clear whether the court meant that an insurer has a duty to look at facts known
from other sources. See infra text accompanying notes 305-10.
98. See infra notes 100-01.
99. See infra text accompanying notes 102-09.
100. See, e.g., La Rotunda v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 408 N.E.2d 928 (Ill. App. Ct.
1980); New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Christy, 200 N.W.2d 834 (Iowa 1972); Shepard Marine
Constr. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 250 N.W.2d 541 (Mich. 1977); Lanoue v. Fireman's
Fund Am. Ins. Co., 278 N.W.2d 49 (Minn. 1979).
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"reasonably ascertainable. '" 10 1
Those jurisdictions that only require an insurer to consider
facts "actually known" do not require the insurer to investigate
the claim. 102 Rather, the insurer is only obligated to consider
those extrinsic facts made known to it by the insured,103 by the
insurer's own voluntary investigation, 0 " or by other means.10 5
In contrast, the jurisdictions that require an insurer to con-
sider those extrinsic facts known or reasonably ascertainable
also require the insurer to investigate the claim. 10 6 These states
impose an affirmative duty on the insurer to make a reasonable
investigation.1 0 7 After investigation, the insurer is obligated to
consider the facts in the complaint, express and implied, and
those facts that it learns of from its investigation, its insured,
and other sources.10 8 The insurer must provide a defense, if the
facts it has knowledge of, if proved, would require the insurer to
indemnify the insured."0 9 Therefore, the four corners of the com-
plaint rule in these jurisdictions is treated as a valid inclusionary
standard but not a valid exclusionary standard. 110 Accordingly,
the complaint allegations are not dispositive if the insurer learns
101. See, e.g., Evan v. Employer's Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 391 F. Supp. 1230 (D. Alaska
1975); Fresno Economy Import Used Cars v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 142 Cal.
Rptr. 681 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978); Loftin v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 127 S.E.2d 53 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1962); Patrons Mut. Ins. Ass'n v. Harmon, 732 P.2d 741 (Kan. 1987); Marshall's
U.S. Auto Supply v. Maryland Cas. Co., 189 S.W.2d 529 (Mo. 1945).
102. See infra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
103. See Lanoue v. Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co., 278 N.W.2d 49 (Minn. 1979)
(holding that insurer was obligated to defend where insured informed insurer of facts
placing claim within coverage).
104. See La Rotunda v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 408 N.E.2d 928 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)
(holding that the insurer was obligated to defend where facts obtained through its own
investigation put claim within policy coverage).
105. See Shepard Marine Constr. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 250 N.W.2d 541 (Mich.
1977) (holding that the insurer was required to defend where facts stipulated by the
parties fell within coverage of policy).
106. Fresno Economy Import Used Cars v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 142 Cal.
Rptr. 681, 685 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
107. See Patrons Mut. Ins. Ass'n v. Harmon, 732 P.2d 741, 744 (Kan. 1987); Mar-
shall's U.S. Auto Supply v. Maryland Cas. Co., 189 S.W.2d 529, 531 (Mo. 1945).
108. Fresno, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 685.
109. See, e.g., Loftin v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 127 S.E.2d 53 (Ga. Ct. App.
1962) (holding that the insurer was required to defend the insured based on facts ascer-
tainable by investigation that placed claim within the coverage of the policy).
110. See JERRY, supra note 22, at 564. This means that the triggering of the in-
surer's duty to defend is not limited to the allegations in the complaint. See id.
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from extrinsic information, either from an investigation or oth-
erwise, that the possibility of coverage exists."u Proponents ar-
gue that the logic behind this rule is unassailable - that an in-
surer should not be permitted to evade its contractual obligation
to defend by ignoring the true facts and instead rely on errone-
ous or mistaken allegations in the complaint, or on a complaint
which lacks certain factual allegations that describe an event
covered under the insurance policy." 2 In sum, these jurisdictions
impose on the insurer an affirmative duty to look beyond the
complaint when determining whether the duty to defend has
been triggered.
B. An Insured's Request For Defense: Standard Procedure
1. Insured's Responsibilities
Initially, "[t]he insured has the burden of proving that the
claim asserted comes within the coverage of the policy." " s This
burden is generally satisfied by tendering to the insurer a com-
plaint which contains facts and allegations that create a reasona-
ble possibility of coverage. 1 4 In addition, the insured must fully
cooperate with the insurer.1 Once the insured has shown the
possible existence of the right to indemnity under the policy, the
111. Id.
112. See WINDT, supra note 27, § 4.03, at 137.
113. Id. § 4.01, at 130; Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Albert Pipe & Supply Co., 484
F. Supp. 1153, 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
114. See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
115. Under the standard CGL policy, an insured is required to cooperate with the
insurer once a claim has been made. Carolyn P. Perry, The Obligations of the Parties -
Conditions Precedent and Subsequent, 1 INT'L RISK MGMT. INST. 515-B (1986). A CGL
policy is a conditional contract with conditions precedent (those conditions that must be
met to trigger the insurer's promises), and conditions subsequent (an action by the in-
sured that extinguishes the insurer's promises in the insurance contract). Id. An in-
sured's failure to cooperate is a condition subsequent. Id. An insured's fraud or material
misrepresentation in making a claim constitutes a failure to cooperate, a condition subse-
quent, which therefore acts to relieve the insurer of its promise to indemnify the insured.
Id. at 515-E. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Erie Basin Carting Co., 68 Misc. 2d
17, 325 N.Y.S.2d 35 (Sup. Ct. 1971), modified on other grounds sub nom., Mastrangelo v.
Strype, 39 A.D.2d 922, 332 N.Y.S.2d 923 (2d Dep't 1972) (holding that the insurer was
entitled to disclaim liability under policy when insured breached cooperation clause by
making false statement in claim); Sweet v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 72 Misc. 2d 1022,
340 N.Y.S.2d 957 (Civ. Ct. 1973) (stating that the duty to cooperate was violated when
insured willfully misstated material facts in claim).
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insured is entitled to an insurer-provided defense.
2. Insurer's Responsibilities and Options
Upon receiving the complaint, the insurer is on notice of its
potential contractual duties.116 The insurer must then make the
often difficult decision of whether it has the duty to defend the
insured under the four corners of the complaint rule.1 1 7 The long
established standard by which this determination has been
made is to compare the allegations in the complaint with the
terms of the policy. 8 After comparison, the insurer has several
options to consider. The insurer may deny coverage, seek rescis-
sion of the policy or defend its insured.
a. Denying Coverage
The insurer may deny coverage to the insured on the
ground that the claim is not covered under the policy.11 9 The
insurer will be justified in denying coverage if the allegations in
the complaint clearly fail to assert any claim for which the in-
surer might be required to indemnify the insured. 20 If an in-
surer chooses to deny coverage, it must adhere to the statutory
requirements set forth in Insurance Law § 3420(d) which pro-
vides that "[i]f under a liability policy ... an insurer shall dis-
claim liability or deny coverage for ... any other type of acci-
dent occurring within this state, it shall give written notice as
soon as is reasonably possible ... to the insured and the injured
person or any other claimant.' 2' Written notice must be
timely,122 and specific as to the grounds relied upon. 2
3
116. JERRY, supra note 22 at 569. See also Sucrest Corp. v. Fisher Governor Co., 83
Misc. 2d 394, 401, 371 N.Y.S.2d 927, 936 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (holding that insurer was put on
notice of its liability when complaint was served on insured and tendered to insurer).
117. See Technicon Elecs. Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 74 N.Y.2d 66, 73,
542 N.E.2d 1048, 1050, 544 N.Y.S.2d 531, 533 (1989).
118. Id.
119. See Henderson v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 55 N.Y.2d 947, 434 N.E.2d 247, 449
N.Y.S.2d 178 (1982).
120. Id.
121. N.Y. INS. LAW § 3420(d) (McKinney 1985).
122. See Hartford Ins. Co. v. County of Nassau, 46 N.Y.2d 1028, 389 N.E.2d 1061,
416 N.Y.S.2d 539 (1979) (holding that whether written notice is in fact timely is gener-
ally considered a question of fact).
123. See General Accident Ins. Group v. Cirucci, 46 N.Y.2d 862, 864, 387 N.E.2d
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Even though the insurer may have properly denied coverage
initially, this does not mean that the duty to defend cannot sub-
sequently arise.2 4 For example, if the complaint is amended or
certain facts indicating coverage are disclosed during discovery,
the duty to defend may still attach. " ' In this situation, the ini-
tial burden is again on the insured to prove that the claim is
within coverage of the policy."'
b. Seeking Rescission
The insurer may seek rescission of the policy if it deter-
mines that the policy was obtained through fraud, misrepresen-
tation, concealment of material facts or mutual mistake of
fact.' 17 In this situation, the duty to defend issue would arise
only if the insurer's rescission efforts were to fail.
c. Defending
If, after comparison of the complaint and the policy, the in-
surer determines that there is a potential duty to indemnify the
insured, it must undertake the defense of the action.12 If there
is uncertainty regarding its duty to defend, the insurer should
assume the defense of the insured under a reservation of rights
to avoid the risk of breaching its contractual duty.129 This allows
the insurer to protect itself and the insured until further investi-
gation reveals whether coverage exists.3 0
223, 225, 414 N.Y.S.2d 512, 514 (1979) (holding that insurer's denial of coverage must be
specific; waiver of all defenses cannot be achieved by a broad unilateral statement by
insurer).
124. Sucrest Corp. v. Fisher Governor Co., 83 Misc. 2d 394, 401, 371 N.Y.S.2d 927,
936 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
125. See id. (the insurer's duty arose after commencement of the underlying action
by service of a third-party complaint); Lee v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 178 F.2d 750, 752-53
(2d Cir. 1949). See generally WINDT, supra note 27, § 4.08, at 149-50.
126. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
127. ROBERT F. CUSHMAN ET AL., PROSECUTING AND DEFENDING INSURANCE CLAIMS §
2.28, at 73 (1989).
128. Technicon Elecs. Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 74 N.Y.2d 66, 73, 542
N.E.2d 1048, 1050, 544 N.Y.S.2d 531, 533 (1989).
129. See CUSHMAN, supra note 127, § 2.28, at 73. See also infra notes 178-93 and
accompanying text for a discussion of reservation of rights.
130. See CUSHMAN, supra note 127, § 2.28, at 73.
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C. The Four Corners of the Complaint Rule: Pre-Fitzpatrick
1. Advantages and Disadvantages
Under the four corners of the complaint rule, the compari-
son of the complaint and the policy is an objective, efficient and
certain test that allows for an immediate determination in most
circumstances." 1 This rule is logical, practical and easy to ap-
ply.132 Its objective nature provides for an easily reviewable de-
termination on appeal. Using this rule, the insurer need only
make a determination based upon the two documents before
it.133 If the insured challenges the insurer's determination in a
declaratory judgment action, the court can base its ruling on the
same two documents.1 3 4
Under a strict application of this rule, the insured may be
denied its contracted-for defense in some instances. This may
occur in those situations where the complaint fails to allege cer-
tain material facts that describe an event covered under the in-
sured's policy or alleges incorrect facts. This seemingly harsh re-
sult may be de minimis because modern pleading rules permit
the pleadings to be amended at any time to conform to the evi-
dence elicited during discovery or at trial.13 5
As a practical matter, this rule in its strict application does
not create any duty to investigate on the part of the insurer.3 6 A
"no duty to investigate" scheme has advantages and disadvan-
tages for both the insurer and the insured. The insurer has the
advantage of an objective test and is saved the increase in oper-
ating costs associated with investigation.13 7 On the other hand,
because of the judicially developed rules to determine whether
the duty to defend exists under the four corners of the com-
plaint rule, the insurer is often forced to assume the defense of
131. See Garbett, supra note 1, at 241-42.
132. See id. at 241.
133. See A. Meyers & Sons Corp. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Group, 74 N.Y.2d 298, 302, 545
N.E.2d 1206, 1208, 546 N.Y.S.2d 818, 820 (1989).
134. Id.
135. See N.Y. CIv. PRAc. L. & R. 3025 (McKinney 1991).
136. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
137. See WINDT, supra note 27, § 4.06, at 147-48. Under a duty to investigate
scheme, "an insurer would have to undertake a thorough investigation in all cases in
which a complaint did not contain averments specifically disproving coverage." See id. at
148.
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many claims that it would not otherwise undertake. 188 The dis-
advantage for the insured is that in some instances the insured
is unfairly denied coverage, which is usually only temporary, be-
cause the plaintiff controls the allegations set forth in the com-
plaint."8 9 The insured often benefits by being provided with a
defense because of the liberal interpretation of the four corners
of the complaint rule.140 Furthermore, where the insurer is not
obligated to spend its resources on investigation, the insured
presumably benefits by paying a lower premium.
2. Consequences of an Insurer's Refusal to Defend
When the insurer makes the determination to deny coverage
and not provide a defense, it does so at its own peril and must
bear the consequences if its decision is wrong. 1 4 This determina-
tion may result in a justified or unjustified refusal. 141 If the in-
surer's refusal is justified, there is no breach of contract and the
insurer incurs no legal liability. 43 Where the insurer makes a
good faith but unjustifiable refusal to defend the insured, a ma-
terial breach of contract results and the insurer is liable to the
insured for damages caused by the breach. 144
138. See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
139. The facts as alleged by the insured would be revealed in pre-trial discovery and
the plaintiff could amend the pleading to conform to the newly discovered evidence. See
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 3025 (McKinney 1991).
140. See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
141. See McGroarty v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 36 N.Y.2d 358, 329 N.E.2d 172, 368
N.Y.S.2d 485 (1975).
142. See generally WINDT, supra note 27, §§ 4.08, 4.09, 4.31.
143. A. Meyers & Sons Corp. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Group, 74 N.Y.2d 298, 545 N.E.2d
1206, 546 N.Y.S.2d 818 (1989) (holding that insurer justifiably refused to defend insured
where allegations in the complaint of patent infringement did not fall within the in-
sured's policy covering any injury arising out of advertising activity and therefore did not
breach its duty to defend); Technicon Elecs. Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 74
N.Y.2d 66, 542 N.E.2d 1048, 544 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1989).
144. Existing in every contract is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 427, 437, 285 N.E.2d 849, 854, 334
N.Y.S.2d 601, 608 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 931 (1973). A good faith refusal exists
when the insurer makes an honest mistake or an erroneous assumption that the claim is
outside policy coverage. See id., 285 N.E.2d at 854, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 609. See generally
JERRY, supra note 22, at 576; WINDT, supra note 27, § 4.31, at 202. The importance of a
"good faith unjustifiable breach" determination (versus a "bad faith unjustifiable
breach") is that the insurer is liable in damages only up to the policy limits. See infra
notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
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Consequently, the insured is no longer obligated to perform
its respective duties under the contract.145 The insured is
thereby excused from the claims processing requirements and
from the duty to cooperate with the insurer.1" Furthermore, the
insurer loses the right to control the defense 14 7 and may not in-
tervene in the action to prohibit settlement by the insured.""8
The duty to defend is contractual, 1 9 therefore, the insured
can recover compensatory damages for the breach, which include
consequential damages.15 Compensatory damages recoverable
by the insured include reasonable attorney fees and costs ex-
pended for the defense of the action. 51 The insured may also
recover any reasonable settlement that the insured has paid
where the insurer's refusal to defend was unjustified. 52 This
holds true even where the policy prohibits settlements without
the insurer's consent. 15  The insurer, however, is not obligated to
pay the insured for a settlement made without its consent unless
it had a duty to indemnify.15 4 Accordingly, it is possible that the
insured may recover defense costs but not money paid as a set-
tlement.155 In addition, the insured may recover consequential
145. See JERRY, supra note 22, at 584.
146. Id.
147. Isadore Rosen & Sons, Inc. v. Security Mut. Ins. Co., 31 N.Y.2d 342, 291
N.E.2d 380, 339 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1972).
148. Cardinal v. State, 304 N.Y. 400, 107 N.E.2d 569, remittitur denied, 304 N.Y.
875, 109 N.E.2d 885 (1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 918 (1953).
149. International Paper Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 35 N.Y.2d 322, 325, 320
N.E.2d 619, 621, 361 N.Y.S.2d 873, 875 (1974) (stating that "[a]n insured's right to be
accorded legal representation is a contractual right . . ").
150. See generally JERRY, supra note 22 at 561; APPLEMAN, supra note 23, § 4689, at
207.
151. Commercial Pipe & Supply Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 619, 282
N.E.2d 128, 331 N.Y.2d 42 (1972) (awarding insured defense costs plus interest where
insurer unjustifiably refused to defend).
152. See APPLEMAN, supra note 23, § 4690, at 222.
153. Sucrest Corp. v. Fisher Governor Co., 83 Misc. 2d 394, 405-06, 371 N.Y.S.2d
927, 940 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (stating that "it is well settled that where an insurer unjustifi-
ably refuses to defend, the insured may make a reasonable settlement... and will there-
after be entitled to reimbursement from the carrier, despite the fact that the policy pur-
ports to avoid liability for settlements made without the insurer's consent.").
154. Servidone Constr. Corp. v. Security Ins. Co., 64 N.Y.2d 419, 423, 477 N.E.2d
441, 444, 488 N.Y.S.2d 139, 142 (1985) (holding that an insurer's breach of duty to de-
fend does not create coverage and there can be no duty to indemnify unless there is a
covered loss).
155. Id.
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol13/iss1/5
DUTY TO DEFEND
damages.1"
Absent proof of bad faith, an insurer that breached its duty
to defend is liable only up to the policy limit.157 Any amount in
excess of the policy limit sought by the insured would constitute
punitive damages and could only be recovered if the insured
showed bad faith on the part of the insurer.'" In Gordon v. Na-
tionwide Mutual Insurance Co.,' 5 9 the New York Court of Ap-
peals held that to constitute a breach of the implied covenant of
good faith in denying coverage "more than an 'arguable case' of
coverage responsibility must be shown" that would evidence a
"gross disregard for [the] policy obligation.' 0
3. Insurer's Alternatives When the Duty to Defend is
Unclear
When an insurer encounters a situation in which it is uncer-
tain whether the duty to defend has been triggered, the insurer
has options from which to choose to prevent the possibility of
breach of contract and to protect its interests.' 6'
a. Declaratory Judgment Action
The insurer may use the declaratory judgment action'62 to
determine the duty to defend issue. 6 ' The declaratory judgment
is a beneficial tool for the insurer in two situations. First, the
insurer may use this tool where the issue that is determinative of
156. See generally JERRY, supra note 22 at 576. Consequential damages are any
damages incurred as a result of the breach that: (1) are foreseeable at the time of the
breach and (2) flow naturally from the breach. See Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep.
145 (1854). Interest paid on a loan to pay for defense costs is a typical example of a
consequential damage in this situation. See WINDT, supra note 27, § 4.32, at 204.
157. United States Fid. and Guar. Co. v. Copfer, 48 N.Y.2d 871, 400 N.E.2d 298, 424
N.Y.S.2d 356 (1979).
158. Id. at 873, 400 N.E.2d at 298-99, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 357.
159. 30 N.Y.2d 427, 285 N.E.2d 849, 334 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
931 (1973). The court held that bad faith "requires an extraordinary showing of disin-
genuous or dishonest failure to carry out a contract." Id. at 437, 285 N.E.2d at 854, 334
N.Y.S.2d at 609.
160. Id. at 431, 285 N.E.2d at 850-51, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 603-04.
161. See infra notes 162-93 and accompanying text.
162. See N.Y. Ctv. PcAc. L. & R. 3001 (McKinney 1991). A declaratory judgment
action is an action that asks the court to declare or establish the rights of the parties
before it in a particular subject matter. See id. at cmt. C3001:1.
163. APPLEMAN, supra note 23, § 4686, at 171-75.
1993]
23
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:141
coverage is unrelated to the factual issues of the lawsuit itself.164
Second, the insurer may use the declaratory judgment action to
determine if the duty to defend exists where the facts in the
lawsuit are not in dispute."' 5 The insurer would use the action to
move for summary judgment to determine if the duty has been
triggered.16
The insurer may not use the declaratory judgment action to
resolve a factual issue that determines coverage if that factual
issue will be litigated in the underlying lawsuit itself.167 There
are several reasons asserted for this principle. First, to try the
issue(s) preliminarily in a declaratory action would result in un-
necessary litigation.""8 Second, if the plaintiff in the underlying
action is joined as a party in the declaratory judgment action, it
would be prejudicial to him to be collaterally estopped from re-
litigating the same issue(s) in the underlying action.16 9 Third,
where the plaintiff in the underlying action is not joined, the
same issues may be litigated twice, resulting in judicial ineffi-
ciency and unfairness to the insured.1 7 1
164. See Zeavin, supra note 58, at 678-79. For example, a declaratory judgment ac-
tion may be used if the insurer asserts that the insured did not give timely notice of the
claim, failed to pay the premium to invoke coverage, canceled the insurance, made a
material misrepresentation in applying for the policy, or breached the policy in some
other way. Id. See also Van Wyck Assocs. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 115 Misc.
2d 447, 454 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Sup. Ct. 1982), aff'd without op., 95 A.D.2d 989, 464 N.Y.S.2d
617 (2d Dep't), appeal denied, 60 N.Y.2d 559, 458 N.E.2d 1261, 470 N.Y.S.2d 1025
(1983) (insurer employed use of declaratory judgment action to determine that it did not
have a duty to defend or indemnify where insured had canceled policy prior to date of
injury alleged in the complaint).
165. See Zeavin, supra note 58, at 679.
166. Id.
167. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Santiago, 98 A.D.2d 608, 469 N.Y.S.2d 343 (1st Dep't 1983)
(holding that the issue of whether employee was driving employer's vehicle with permis-
sion is a question of fact to be determined in the underlying action and therefore is not
appropriate for a declaratory judgment action brought by the employer's insurer). In
Colon v. Aetna Life and Cas. Ins. Co., 66 N.Y.2d 6, 484 N.E.2d 1040, 494 N.Y.S.2d 688
(1985), the New York Court of Appeals made an exception to this principle. The court
held that even if the issue may be litigated in the underlying action, if "the issue is
clearcut, the .. . insurer should be entitled to obtain a prompt judicial determination,
whether by summary judgment, declaratory judgment or otherwise that, contrary to the
allegations of the ... complaint .... the insurer is not obligated ... to furnish a defense.
.Id. at 10, 484 N.E.2d at 1042, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 690.
168. See Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co. v. Lauria, 54 A.D.2d 183, 185, 388 N.Y.S.2d 432,
435 (4th Dep't 1976).
169. See Zeavin, supra note 58, at 681.
170. Id.
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When a declaratory judgment action is brought to deter-
mine whether the insurer's duty to defend has been triggered,
the question arises as to who is responsible for the legal costs of
the action. 1 7 New York courts adhere to the general rule fol-
lowed by most American courts that any party bringing an ac-
tion to settle his rights must be responsible for the costs of
bringing such action.172 Accordingly, if the insured brings the ac-
tion to determine or enforce the duty to defend, the insured can-
not recover the costs. 7 ' However, if the insurer brings the action
and casts the insured in a defensive posture, the insured may
recover the defense costs in the declaratory judgment action 74
provided that the insured is ultimately found to have
coverage.1
75
Therefore, when available, the use of the declaratory judg-
ment action allows the insurer to avoid the risk of breach, 76 and
if the insurer prevails, also to avoid the cost of the defense in the
underlying action. Although a seemingly attractive option, use of
a declaratory judgment action has some possible disadvantages:
(1) the proceeding may not be immediately available; (2) the dis-
covery process may aid the adverse party in the underlying ac-
tion and therefore affect the settlement process if reached; (3)
the insurer will be liable for all of the attorney's fees for both
parties in the action if it loses; and (4) the insured is likely to
become a hostile adversary as a result of the action.' 77
171. Mighty Midgets v. Centennial Ins. Co., 47 N.Y.2d 12, 21-22, 389 N.E.2d 1080,
1085, 416 N.Y.S.2d 559, 564 (1979).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See Ostrager, supra note 62, at 82; Schwamb v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 41 N.Y.2d
947, 949, 363 N.E.2d 356, 357, 394 N.Y.S.2d 632, 633 (1977).
175. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. International Flavors & Fragrances, Inc. 822 F.
Supp. 267 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that insured was not entitled to legal costs to defend
declaratory judgment action where insurer found not obligated to indemnify the in-
sured); Brown v. United States Fid. and Guar. Co., 46 A.D.2d 97, 361 N.Y.S.2d 232 (3d
Dep't 1974).
176. Also avoided are the risk of waiver and estoppel. See infra notes 181-83 and
accompanying text.
177. See JERRY, supra note 22 at 609.
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b. Reservation of Rights
In cases where a declaratory judgment action is either inap-
propriate or not immediately available, the insurer can protect
itself by assuming the defense of the insured under a reservation
of rights.1 8 By taking this step, the insurer preserves its right to
raise coverage issues as the lawsuit progresses. 17 This is a better
approach than (1) outright denial of coverage with the attendant
possibility of breach of contract, or (2) assuming full defense
without protection from waiver or estoppel.180
Should the insurer assume a defense and fail to reserve its
rights, it runs the risk that the insured will use the doctrines of
waiver and/or estoppel to preclude the insurer from later raising
coverage defenses. The doctrine of waiver is based on the pre-
mise that an insurer, having assumed a defense, has waived the
right to claim that coverage does not exist.' 8' The doctrine of
estoppel can also be invoked by the insured to prevent an in-
surer from subsequently asserting a coverage defense, but re-
quires prejudicial or detrimental reliance by the insured in re-
sponse to the insurer's conduct.'82 The doctrines of waiver and
estoppel, however, cannot create coverage where none existed
under the policy initially. 83 Therefore, absent an outright denial
of policy coverage when no waiver question exists, the insurer
should reserve its rights to later assert coverage defenses.181
The reservation of rights can take the form of either a non-
waiver agreement or a reservation of rights notice.'85 A non-
178. See infra notes 185-90 and accompanying text.
179. See CUSHMAN, supra note 127, § 2.28, at 73.
180. Id.
181. See General Accident Ins. Group v. Cirucci, 46 N.Y.2d 862, 387 N.E.2d 223, 414
N.Y.S.2d 512 (1979).
182. Albert J. Schiff Assocs. v. Flack, 51 N.Y.2d 692, 417 N.E.2d 84, 435 N.Y.S.2d
972 (1980). An insured could assert the doctrine of equitable estoppel where an insurer,
"though not in fact obligated to provide coverage, without asserting policy defenses or
reserving the privilege to do so, undertakes the defense of the case, in reliance on which
the insured suffers the detriment of losing the right to control his own defense." Id. at
699, 417 N.E.2d at 87, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 975.
183. See Zappone v. Home Ins. Co., 55 N.Y.2d 131, 432 N.E.2d 783, 447 N.Y.S.2d
911 (1982). In addition, the insurer can only waive or be estopped from denying defenses
to policy coverage that it was aware of at the time it assumed the defense. See CUSHMAN,
supra note 127, § 2.28, at 73.
184. See infra notes 185-91 and accompanying text.
185. APPLEMAN, supra note 23, § 4686, at 169.
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waiver agreement is a bilateral agreement entered into between
the insurer and the insured. The agreement states that the in-
surer's assumption of the defense does not constitute a waiver of
the insurer's right to contest coverage and does not estop the
insurer from later asserting coverage defenses.18 6 A reservation
of rights letter is a unilateral communication from the insurer to
the insured that is intended to have the same effect.18 7 To be
valid, both forms of reservation must be prompt'88and spe-
cific. 89 If the insurer learns of additional grounds for denial of
coverage after making the initial reservation, a supplemental
reservation should be sent specifying the new defenses. 190
As a practical matter, when the insurer assumes the in-
sured's defense under a reservation of rights, it (1) avoids a pos-
sible breach of contract; (2) avoids possible waiver; (3) avoids
being estopped from denying coverage; and (4) maintains control
over the defense of the action.' 9' In some situations the reserva-
tion presents a conflict of interest among the defense attorney,
the insured, and the insurer. 92 In the event of a conflict, the
insurer may be required to hire independent defense counsel or
reimburse the insured for counsel selected by the insured. 93
D. Non-Duty to Defend Policies: Ducking the Duty to Defend
Problem
Although most liability insurance policies, typified by the
CGL policy, contain a duty to defend provision in addition to
the indemnity provision, 94 some do not. 95 These policies are
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See Van Wyck Assocs. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 115 Misc. 2d 447, 454
N.Y.S.2d 266 (Sup. Ct. 1982) (holding that insurer's notice two days after initially agree-
ing to defend did not estop insurer from denying coverage); Globe Indem. Co. v. Franklin
Paving Co., 77 A.D.2d 581, 430 N.Y.S.2d 109 (2d Dep't 1980) (holding that insurer's
delay of fourteen months in denying coverage estopped it from denying coverage). See
generally APPLEMAN, supra note 23, § 4692, at 296.
189. See CUSHMAN, supra note 127, § 2.28, at 73; Zeavin, supra note 58, at 666.
190. See CUSHMAN, supra note 127, § 2.28, at 73.
191. See supra notes 178-90 and accompanying text.
192. For a thorough discussion of the conflict of interest problem, see WINDT, supra
note 27, §§ 4.18-4.22, at 169-83.
193. New York State Urban Dev. Corp. v. VSL Corp., 563 F. Supp. 187, 190
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
194. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
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known as "single promise" policies, in contrast to "dual prom-
ise" policies. 191 In a single promise policy, the insurer's only obli-
gation is to indemnify the insured after the insured has actually
suffered a loss covered by the policy. 197 Most single promise in-
demnity policies do contain a provision, however, that obligates
the insurer to indemnify the insured for costs incurred in its
defense. 198
There are several distinct differences in an insurer's obliga-
tion concerning defense costs under a single promise policy.
First, the typical provision obligating the insurer to pay for de-
fense costs in a single promise policy contains no reference to
the defense of groundless claims. 199 Therefore, the insurer is re-
quired to indemnify the insured only for defense costs that arise
out of claims that are covered under the policy and for which
the insured is found to be legally liable.200 Second, the single
promise policy does not confer upon the insurer the right to pro-
vide counsel for the litigation or to control the litigation.20'
Thus, if the policy expressly denies the obligation to pay for de-
fense costs as they are incurred, the insurer's obligation to in-
demnify the insured for defense costs does not arise until either
the date of disposition of the claim, or upon the determination
of the insurer's liability under the insurance policy.202
Third, under a single promise policy the insurer may not be
obligated to pay for all of the defense costs where some of the
claims asserted are not covered under the policy.23 In order to
195. Kennedy, supra note 3, at 27.
196. Id. A dual promise policy contains two promises: the promise to defend and the
promise to indemnify. See APPLEMAN, supra note 23.
197. See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 27.
198. WINirr, supra note 27, § 6.18, at 328.
199. Joel M. Simon, Non-Duty To Defend Policies: Defense Costs, N.Y.S.B.J., Jan.
1991, at 17.
200. Id.
201. Pepsico v. Continental Cas. Co., 640 F. Supp. 656, 666 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
202. Board of Educ. v. CNA Ins.*Co., 647 F. Supp. 1495, 1507 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd,
839 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1988).
203. Simon, supra note 199, at 18, 20. This is in contrast to the dual promise poli-
cies, such as the standard CGL policy, where the insurer is obligated to pay all of the
defense costs. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. According to the New York
State Department of Insurance, in single promise policies, the insurer must pay all of the
insured's defense costs unless an express policy provision allows for allocation. Simon,
supra note 199, at 18 n.15.
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allocate defense costs, the insurer has the burden of showing
that the defense costs sought to be allocated are separate and
distinct from the uncovered claims costs. 20 ' Where contempora-
neous payments 20 5 are required and an allocation between cov-
ered and uncovered defense costs initially cannot be determined,
the insurer may later seek reimbursement of those costs ad-
vanced to the insured for uncovered claims.2 °0 For an insurer to
be entitled to reimbursement, the policy must have a provision
declaring this right.207 Here, again, the burden is on the insurer
to prove that the amount it seeks as reimbursement is clearly
separate from the amount for covered claims. 08
From the insurer's perspective, the single promise indem-
nity policy appears to be a favorable alternative to the standard
dual promise liability policy with regard to defense costs.209 If
the policy provides for reimbursement of defense costs but ex-
pressly states that there is no duty to make contemporaneous
payments, the insurer is only obligated to indemnify the insured
for defense costs for adjudicated covered claims.210 Although the
insurer loses control over the defense and the settlement pro-
cess, the direct result is that the insurer's defense costs are lower
than the defense costs under the standard dual promise
policy.2 11
III. Fitzpatrick v. American Honda Motor Co.
A. Introduction
In Fitzpatrick v. American Honda Motor Co.,21 2 the New
York Court of Appeals abandoned the traditional four corners of
the complaint rule used to determine when an insurer's duty to
204. Pepsico, 640 F. Supp. at 660.
205. Contemporaneous payment of insurance defense costs is required where there
is not an express provision in the policy denying that obligation. See id. at 659-66.
206. Id. at 659.
207. Id. Other jurisdictions have also allowed an insurer to reserve the right to re-
cover defense costs later determined to be for uncovered claims. See, e.g., Okada v.
MGIC Indem. Corp., 608 F. Supp. 383 (D. Haw. 1985).
208. Simon, supra note 199, at 20.
209. See supra notes 197-208 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 197-208 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 197-210 and accompanying text.
212. 78 N.Y.2d 61, 575 N.E.2d 90, 571 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1991).
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defend its insured is triggered. 2 s The four corners of the com-
plaint rule employed an objective comparison test that only re-
quired the insurer to compare the policy to the facts alleged in
the complaint in determining whether coverage might exist
under the policy and consequently trigger its duty to defend.21
The new rule of Fitzpatrick hinges the insurer's duty to defend
on a subjective test, requiring an insurer to defend based on its
actual knowledge of the claim as well as on the facts alleged in
the complaint.2 15 After Fitzpatrick, unless the complaint states
facts sufficient to invoke a duty to defend under the policy, the
insurer is left in a state of uncertainty - to defend or not to
defend?21
In the underlying action, Linda Fitzpatrick (the plaintiff)
sought to recover damages for the wrongful death of her hus-
band.1 7 The complaint alleged that the decedent was fatally in-
jured while operating a 1985 Honda all-terrain vehicle owned by
defendant Frank Moramarco and operated on property owned
by Cherrywood Property Owners Association (CPOA).2 1 ' The
complaint further alleged that Moramarco, an employee of
CPOA, hired the decedent as an independent contractor to per-
form certain services.2 1 9 The plaintiff sought recovery from
CPOA as the property owner where the incident occurred and
from Moramarco as the owner of the vehicle. 2 0 After defendant
Moramarco received the summons and complaint, he notified
National Casualty Company (National)21 requesting that the in-
surer provide him with a defense.2 2
National had issued a Manufacturer's and Contractor's Lia-
213. Id. at 70, 575 N.E.2d at 95, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 677.
214. Id. at 65, 71, 575 N.E.2d at 91-92, 96, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 673-74, 678.
215. Id. at 67, 575 N.E.2d at 93, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 675.
216. See Anthony J. McNulty, The Duty To Defend Dilemma After Fitzpatrick v.
American Honda Motor Co., Inc. and Moramarco, DEFENDANT (Defense Ass'n of N.Y.),
Sept. 1991, at 19.
217. Fitzpatrick, 78 N.Y.2d at 63, 575 N.E.2d at 90, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 672.
218. Id.
219. Id., 575 N.E.2d at 91, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 672-73.
220. Fitzpatrick v. American Honda Motor Co., 159 A.D.2d 548, 549, 552 N.Y.S.2d
413, 414 (2d Dep't 1990).
221. National is a subsidiary of Nationwide Insurance Company. Respondent's Brief
(Cover), Fitzpatrick v. American Honda Motor Co., 78 N.Y.2d 61, 575 N.E.2d 90, 571
N.Y.S.2d 672 (1991) (No. 14233/87) [hereinafter Respondent's Brief].
222. Fitzpatrick, 78 N.Y.2d at 64, 575 N.E.2d at 91, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 673.
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bility Policy to Cherrywood Landscaping Incorporated (CLI), 2 2
of which Moramarco was the sole stockholder and president.
224
The policy afforded liability coverage to the corporation only,
but named as additional insureds "any executive officer, director
or stockholder ... [thereof] while acting within the scope of his
duties as such. ' 225 National refused to provide a defense for
Moramarco, "stating that the policy it had issued to CLI did not
appear to cover the claim. '226 Following National's refusal,
Moramarco commenced a third-party action against National
seeking defense costs and liability indemnification.227
B. Procedural History
Moramarco's third-party action sought payment of his legal
fees and indemnity for any judgment that might be entered
against him in the main action.228 National moved to dismiss the
action pursuant to New York Civil Practice Law and Rules sec-
tions 3211(a)(1) and (7).229 In response to National's motion to
dismiss, Moramarco submitted an affidavit asserting that he was
acting in his corporate capacity of CLI at the time of the acci-
dent and therefore was an additional insured under the policy.230
The trial court denied National's motion to dismiss, holding that
the coverage issue "must await a plenary trial.
281
On appeal, the Appellate Division unanimously reversed on
the facts and dismissed the third-party complaint. 2 2 The court
held that whether coverage exists is a matter of law, and that
the determination is made by examining the allegations of the
223. Fitzpatrick, 159 A.D.2d at 549, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 414.
224. Appellant's Brief at 2, Fitzpatrick v. American Honda Motor Co., 78 N.Y.2d 61,
575 N.E.2d 90, 571 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1991) (No. 14233/87) [hereinafter Appellant's Brief].
225. Fitzpatrick, 78 N.Y.2d at 64, 575 N.E.2d at 91, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 673.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 3211 (McKinney 1992). A C.P.L.R. 3211(a)(1) motion to
dismiss is based on the ground that a defense is founded on documentary evidence; a
C.P.L.R. 3211(a)(7) motion to dismiss is based on the ground that the pleading fails to
state a cause of action. Id.
230. Fitzpatrick, 78 N.Y.2d at 64, 575 N.E.2d at 91, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 673.
231. Id. A plenary trial is a complete trial on the merits as distinguished from a
summary hearing. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1154 (6th ed. 1990).
232. Fitzpatrick v. American Honda Motor Co., 159 A.D.2d 548, 552 N.Y.S.2d 413
(2d Dep't 1990).
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complaint.2 3 The court made the following findings of fact: (1)
the insured, CLI, was not named in the complaint; (2) the com-
plaint named Moramarco in his individual capacity, not in his
corporate capacity as required under the CLI policy in order to
qualify as an additional insured; and (3) Moramarco did not as-
sert that he acted in his corporate capacity until after National
moved to dismiss. 2 4 The court held that the documentary evi-
dence2 38 submitted by National was sufficient to support a mo-
tion to dismiss and that the complaint allegations did not bring
the claim within the insurance coverage of the policy held by
CLI. 3 6 The court granted National's motion to dismiss.237 The
New York Court of Appeals granted leave for Moramarco to ap-
peal from the Appellate Division.23
C. Facts of the Case
On appeal, Moramarco submitted a record for the court's
review that contained: (1) the documentary evidence submitted
by National in its motion to dismiss, including the insurance
policy and the main complaint; and (2) the extrinsic evidence
consisting of the third-party complaint, Moramarco's affidavit in
opposition to National's motion to dismiss, and other relevant
information.3 9
1. The Documentary Evidence
a. The Insurance Policy
The insurance policy issued to CLI was a Manufacturer's
and Contractor's Liability Policy. 240 The policy coverage section
provided that:
233. Id. at 549, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 414.
234. Id. at 549-50, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 414.
235. The court was referring to the complaint and the insurance policy.
236. Fitzpatrick, 159 A.D.2d at 550, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 414.
237. Id.
238. Fitzpatrick v. American Honda Motor Co., 76 N.Y.2d 702, 558 N.E.2d 41, 559
N.Y.S.2d 239 (1990).
239. Record at 1-92, Fitzpatrick v. American Honda Motor Co., 78 N.Y.2d 61, 575
N.E.2d 90, 571 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1991) (No. 14233/87) [hereinafter Record].
240. Id. at 42. For a brief discussion of this type of policy, see supra notes 39-40 and
accompanying text.
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The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the
insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because
of
A. bodily injury or
B. property damage
to which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence, and the
company shall have the right and duty to defend any suit
against the Insured seeking damages on account of such bodily
injury or property damage, even if any of the allegations of the
suit are groundless, false or fraudulent, and may make such inves-
tigation and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedient
241
In addition to providing coverage for the named insured,
here CLI, the policy provided for liability coverage of any execu-
tive, director or stockholder of CLI while acting within the scope
of his duties of such position.242 The exclusion section of the pol-
icy stated that "[tihis insurance does not apply... (q) to bodily
injury or property damage arising out of operations performed
for the named Insured by independent contractors or acts or
omissions of the named Insured in connection with his general
"1245supervision of such operations ....
b. The Main Complaint
The plaintiff's complaint in the underlying action alleged
that her husband, John J. Fitzpatrick, died as a result of the
negligence and carelessness of the defendants Frank Moramarco
and Cherrywood Property Owner's Association (CPOA).2 44 The
241. Record, supra note 239, at 43 (emphasis added).
242. The "Persons Insured" section of the policy stated:
Each of the following is an Insured under this Insurance to the extent set forth
below ... (c) if the named Insured is designated in the declarations as other than
an individual, partnership or joint venture, the organization so designated and any
executive officer, director or stockholder thereof while acting within the scope of
his duties as such ....
Id. at 44.
243. Id. This exclusion section was particularly relevant in National's decision not
to defend because the plaintiffs complaint specifically stated that the decedent was an
independent contractor for CLI. See supra text accompanying note 219.
244. Record, supra note 239, at 24. Paragraph 39 of the complaint stated "[t]hat...
the defendants, Cherrywood and Frank Moramarco, were negligent and careless in the
ownership, operation, maintenance, administration and control of the premises owned by
Cherrywood, and were further negligent and careless in the ownership, maintenance, use,
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complaint also alleged that Moramarco was an employee of
CPOA4 5 and that the decedent was employed as an independent
contractor by Moramarco and/or CPOA.2 ,6 In addition, the alle-
gations in the complaint stated that at the time of the fatal inci-
dent neither Moramarco nor CPOA was engaged in any activity
for pecuniary gain. 7
The plaintiff alleged in the complaint that the decedent
died as the result of injuries sustained while operating a Honda
all-terrain vehicle that was owned by Moramarco "8 and that was
operated on CPOA's premises. 49 Specifically, the complaint al-
leged that the defendants were negligent and careless in the su-
pervision and control of the Honda all-terrain vehicle and in the
ownership and control of the premises where the fatal accident
occurred.25
2. The Extrinsic Evidence
a. The Third-Party Complaint
The third-party complaint instituted by Moramarco against
National alleged that National had issued an insurance policy to
Moramarco's employer, CLI.25 1 The complaint further alleged
that the plaintiff in the main action named Moramarco as a de-
fendant "entirely on the basis of events arising out of [his] em-
ployment" with CLI.2 52 Therefore, Moramarco alleged that
under the terms of the insurance policy issued to CLI, National
was "obliged to defend and indemnify" him in the action.2 ss
supervision and control of the 1985 Honda ATC herein." Id. Paragraph 40 stated "[t]hat
as a result of the negligence and carelessness of these defendants, John J. Fitzpatrick, Jr.
died on or about October 31, 1985." Id.
245. Id. at 20. Plaintiff's allegation places Moramarco's claim within a policy exclu-
sion of CLI's policy - because it is a Manufacturer's and Contractor's policy it does not
provide coverage for liability arising from the use of independent contractors. See supra
notes 39-40, 243 and accompanying text.
246. Record, supra note 239, at 21.
247. Id. at 22.
248. Id. at 21, 24.
249. Id. at 22.
250. Id. at 22, 24.
251. Id. at 15-16.
252. Id. at 16.
253. Id.
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b. Moramarco's Affidavit in Response to National's
Motion to Dismiss
Upon receiving the third-party complaint, National moved
to dismiss the complaint.2 4 National based its motion on the
fact that the main complaint did not name its insured, CLI, and
that the main complaint did not allege any facts that would trig-
ger coverage under the terms of the policy.2 55 In response,
Moramarco submitted an affidavit in opposition to the motion
claiming that based on the true facts, the event fell within the
terms of the policy issued to CLI and therefore National was
obligated to defend and indemnify him.2 "
In his affidavit, Moramarco stated that CPOA hired CLI to
do grounds work on its property.5 7 Moramarco also stated that
he was a stockholder, director, president, and chief executive of-
ficer of CLI. 25 Furthermore, Moramarco stated that in contrast
to the facts alleged in the main complaint, CLI was the owner of
the Honda all-terrain vehicle, employed him, and employed the
decedent.25 9
Moramarco stated that based on the persons insured section
of the insurance policy issued to CLI, which included as an in-
sured "any executive officer. . . while acting within the scope of
his duties as such," 0 he was an insured..2 6 He explained that if
the event occurred as alleged in the complaint, he was acting in
his supervisory role as president of CLI and therefore the event
fell within the coverage terms of the policy.2 2
254. Id. at 12-13.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 53-56.
257. Id. at 55.
258. Id. at 53.
259. Id. at 55.
260. Id. at 54.
261. Id. at 55, 56.
262. Id. at 55. Moramarco argued that the court should not permit National to "use
such a minor imprecision in pleading to escape its duties under the policy it issued" and
accordingly should deny the motion'to dismiss. Id. at 56-57. The "minor imprecision"
that Moramarco referred to was the allegations in the complaint that stated that he was
employed by CPOA and that he was the owner of the Honda all-terrain vehicle.
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3. Other Extrinsic Information In The Record
The record on appeal contained Moramarco's answer to the
underlying complaint. The answer made assertions that were
substantially similar to those in the affidavit in response to Na-
tional's motion to dismiss. 83 Also included was the correspon-
dence between Moramarco and National prior to the third-party
action. 64  The correspondence contained letters from
Moramarco's attorney to National stating that "since the vehicle
in question was owned for and to be used exclusively for land-
scaping operations we expect you to provide a defense," 262 and
"demanding a defense for the claim arising entirely out of his
employment by your insured, which is required to defend its em-
ployee."266 In addition, the record contained a letter from
Moramarco's insurance agent stating, "it is my understanding
that, because this vehicle is used in the insured's landscaping
operation, he would automatically be covered under his liability
policy. '267 National's response in all instances was the same:
"The suit does not name Cherrywood Landscaping [CLI] - it
does name the owner by name - we do not insure the owner as
an individual - we do insure Cherrywood Landscaping
[CLI] ."26
Also submitted for the record was an affidavit from the at-
torney for the plaintiff in the underlying action. The affidavit
stated that because Moramarco came forward with an affidavit
stating that he was the president of CLI, the motion by National
"must [] fail. '26 9 It further stated that "[a]ny ambiguity whatso-
ever as to whether Frank Moramarco was an 'executive officer,
director or stockholder'" at the time of the alleged incident
"must be resolved in favor of the insured and against National
Casualty. "270
263. Id. at 27-29.
264. Id. at 58-91.
265. Id. at 58.
266. Id. at 68.
267. Id. at 85.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 93.
270. Id. at 94. At the time that Linda Fitzpatrick's attorney submitted this affidavit,
CLI had still not been added as a codefendant in the complaint. However, CLI had been
impleaded as a third-party defendant by the other defendants in the main action. See
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D. The Court of Appeals Decision
1. The Majority Opinion
In a 4-3 vote, the majority reversed and denied National's
motion to dismiss.2 71 The Court of Appeals held that "rather
than mechanically applying only the 'four corners of the com-
plaint' rule in these circumstances, the sounder approach is to
require the insurer to provide a defense when it has actual
knowledge of facts establishing a reasonable possibility of cover-
age. ' 272 The court stated that an insurer cannot use a third-
party's pleadings "as a shield to avoid its contractual duty to
defend." 273
Writing for the majority, Judge Titone stated that the ra-
tionale of the four corners of the complaint rule is that the duty
to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify.27 4 Accordingly,
the court stated that the duty to defend is triggered whenever
the pleadings allege facts which potentially bring the claim
within policy coverage even if extrinsic facts exist that show the
claim is without merit. 75 Therefore, the court stated that the
insurer is not permitted to look beyond the complaint to avoid
the obligation to defend.27
The court held, however, that recognizing this rule "is a far
cry from saying that the complaint allegations are the sole crite-
ria for measuring the scope of that duty. 2 7 7 In fact, the court
stated that to adhere to a "wooden application of the 'four cor-
ners of the complaint' rule would render the duty to defend nar-
rower than the duty to indemnify - clearly an unacceptable re-
sult.1 7 8 The court pronounced the new rule that even where a
complaint does not allege a covered occurrence, if the insurer
has "actual knowledge of facts establishing a reasonable possibil-
McNulty, supra note 216, at 17-19.
271. Fitzpatrick v. American Honda Motor Co., 78 N.Y.2d 61, 575 N.E.2d 90, 571
N.Y.S.2d 672 (1991).
272. Id. at 67, 575 N.E.2d at 93, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 675.
273. Id. at 63, 575 N.E.2d at 90, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 672.
274.. Id. at 65, 575 N.E.2d at 92, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 674.
275. Id. at 66, 575 N.E.2d at 92, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 674.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
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ity of coverage," the insurer has a duty to defend." 9
The court summarily rejected any implied corollary duty to
investigate on the part of the insured. 280 The court justified its
holding by stating that: (1) the duty to defend flows in the first
instance from the insurance contract between the insurer and
insured;281 (2) the insured's right to his contracted-for defense
should not depend solely on the facts alleged in a third-party
complaint;28 2 (3) modern pleading rules render the initial insuffi-
ciency of alleged facts meaningless if the actual facts would
come out at the first discovery process or hearing and the plead-
ing would be amended to conform to the facts;283 and (4) to deny
the defense at the inception of the lawsuit would make the in-
surer-provided defense provision useless. 284
In applying the rule to the case at hand, the court stated
that the insured made facts known to the insurer that "unques-
tionably involved a covered event."2 85 Therefore, even though
the complaint on its face did not support a reasonable possibil-
ity of coverage, the insurer had a duty to defend. 8 The court
found that Moramarco had been mistakenly sued as an em-
ployee of CPOA and as the owner of the injury-causing vehicle.
Had the complaint correctly identified him, he would have been
covered under the policy as an additional insured.287 The court
stated that to deny Moramarco an insurer-provided defense
would "afford the insurer [National] an undeserved windfall" 288
and was not within Moramarco's reasonable expectation when
he purchased the policy.289
The court concluded that an application of the four corners
of the complaint rule was not required by its prior cases290 and
279. Id. at 67, 575 N.E.2d at 93, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 675.
280. Id. at 67 n.2, 575 N.E.2d at 93 n.2, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 675 n.2.
281. Id. at 68, 575 N.E.2d at 93, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 675.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 68-69, 575 N.E.2d at 94, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 676.
284. Id. at 70, 575 N.E.2d at 95, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 677.
285. Id. at 69, 575 N.E.2d at 94, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 676.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 69 n.4, 575 N.E.2d at 94 n.4, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 676 n.4.
290. Id. at 70, 575 N.E.2d at 95, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 677. The court here was referring
to Commercial Pipe & Supply Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 36 A.D.2d 412, 331 N.Y.S.2d 219
(4th Dep't), aff'd, 30 N.Y.2d 619, 282 N.E.2d 128, 331 N.Y.S.2d 42 (1972) and Sucrest
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that to do so would "exalt [] form over substance."29 ' Therefore,
the court held that an insurer is required "to provide a defense
where, notwithstanding the complaint allegations, underlying
facts made known to the insurer create a 'reasonable possibility
that the insured may be liable for some act or omission covered
by the policy.' ",292 The court reversed the lower court's holding
and reinstated the complaint against National.293
2. The Dissent
The three-judge dissent, written by Judge Alexander, found
no justification for abandoning the well established four corners
of the complaint rule. 94 Judge Alexander stated that "[i]t is axi-
omatic that the obligations of a liability insurance carrier to its
insured are governed by the terms of the contract of insurance
between them and it is only by examining the terms and condi-
tions of that policy that those obligations can be determined
with certainty."2 "9 The dissent maintained that the determina-
tion of whether there is a duty to defend should be made by
comparing the terms of the policy with the allegations of the
complaint 296 and noted that this rule "serves to give certainty
and definiteness to the insurer's duty to defend. 2 97 Further,
Judge Alexander asserted that the new rule advanced by the
majority "abandons any truly objective standard" and "ex-
presses the majority's intent to substitute an uncertain subjec-
tive standard. '298
Readily acknowledging the principle that the duty to defend
is broader than the duty to indemnify,299 the dissent maintained
that where the "allegations, on their face, are within the com-
pass of the risk covered by the insurance policy, the insurer is
Corp. v. Fisher Governor Co., 83 Misc. 2d 394, 371 N.Y.S.2d 927 (Sup. Ct. 1975). See
supra notes 77-97 and accompanying text.
291. Fitzpatrick v. American Honda Motor Co., 78 N.Y.2d 61, 70, 575 N.E.2d 90, 95,
571 N.Y.S.2d 672, 677 (1991).
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id., 575 N.E.2d at 95, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 677 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
295. Id. at 70-71, 575 N.E.2d at 95, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 677.
296. Id. at 71, 575 N.E.2d at 95, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 677.
297. Id. at 71 n.1, 575 N.E.2d at 96 n.1, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 678 n.1.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 71, 575 N.E.2d at 95, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 677.
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obligated [to defend]. '"300 Thus, to Judge Alexander, it logically
followed that if the allegations are not within the coverage of the
policy, the insurer does not have a duty to defend.30 1 The dissent
further noted that this had been the long established rule, un-
broken until now.3 02
In applying the rule to the case at hand, the dissent found
that National had no duty to defend because: (1) CLI was not a
named defendant; (2) Moramarco as an individual was not a
named insured; (3) the complaint did not allege that Moramarco
was acting as an officer of CLI; and (4) the complaint in fact
alleged that Moramarco was an agent of CPOA and that CPOA
was not an insured under the policy. 303 By "[d]eviating from...
settled rules" and requiring an insurer to provide a defense
based on its knowledge of facts outside the complaint relating to
the claim, Judge Alexander noted that the majority failed to ac-
knowledge a new implied duty to investigate - "a requirement
that th[e] Court ha[d] never before imposed." 04
Furthermore, the dissent noted that the two New York
cases relied upon by the majority to support the "expanded"
rule did not in fact stand for that proposition.30 5 Specifically, it
stated that in Commercial Pipe & Supply Corp. v. Allstate3 6
the court merely relied on the potentiality interpretation of the
four corners of the complaint rule, that the allegations of the
complaint potentially brought the case within the coverage of
the policy.307 In Sucrest v. Fisher Governor Co.,308 the court re-
lied upon the allegations of the underlying complaint in conjunc-
tion with allegations in a supplemental complaint, to determine
whether there was a duty to defend.309 Therefore, the Fitzpat-
300. Id., 575 N.E.2d at 96, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 678.
301. Id. at 72, 575 N.E.2d at 96, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 678.
302. Id. at 71, 575 N.E.2d at 95, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 677.
303. Id. at 72-73, 575 N.E.2d at 96, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 678-79. In fact, the main com-
plaint further alleged that Moramarco was not engaged in any activity for pecuniary
gain, thereby directly contradicting Moramarco's claim that he was acting in his corpo-
rate capacity. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
304. Fitzpatrick v. American Honda Motor Co., 78 N.Y.2d 61, 73, 575 N.E.2d 90, 97,
571 N.Y.S.2d 672, 679.(1991).
305. Id. at 73 n.2, 575 N.E.2d at 97 n.2, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 679 n.2.
306. See supra notes 77-86 and accompanying text.
307. Fitzpatrick, 78 N.Y.2d at 73 n.2, 575 N.E.2d at 97 n.2, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 679 n.2.
308. See supra notes 87-97 and accompanying text.
309. Fitzpatrick, 78 N.Y.2d at 73 n.2, 575 N.E.2d at 97 n.2, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 679 n.2.
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rick dissent maintained that the majority had based its new rule
on erroneous interpretations of those cases. 10
The dissent concluded that: (1) the new rule supplants cer-
tainty with uncertainty; (2) the new rule will increase collateral
proceedings to determine whether the duty to defend exists; and
(3) those proceedings will be more complicated because the
courts will no longer have an objective test - they will have to
look beyond the complaint to discover the actual facts."' l
IV. Analysis
A. Fitzpatrick - A Just Rule
The new rule established by the Fitzpatrick majority pro-
vides for just and equitable results, and enforces the contracted-
for right of an insurer-provided defense.312  Under the new rule,
when an insurer determines whether it has a duty to defend its
insured, it must consider not only those facts alleged in the com-
plaint but also those facts of which it has knowledge. 13 There-
fore, an insurer is prohibited from using third-party pleadings
"as a shield to avoid its contractual duty to defend"3" ' and is
required to provide a defense even when the complaint fails to
allege facts that invoke coverage under the policy if the insurer
has "actual knowledge of facts establishing a reasonable possibil-
ity of coverage. ' ' 15
The practical result of the Fitzpatrick rule is that an in-
sured will now be able to enforce the defense provision of the
insurance policy in those situations when the actual facts are
different from the facts alleged in the complaint. The insured's
right to an insurer-provided defense will no longer be held hos-
tage to the facts that a complete stranger chooses to include in
his complaint. This result is equitable and within sound princi-
ples of contract law; a person who enters into a contract (the
insurance policy) and provides consideration (the premium)
should be able to enforce the provisions of the contract (indem-
310. Id.
311. Id. at 73, 575 N.E.2d at 97, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 679.
312. See supra notes 285-91 and accompanying text.
313. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
314. See supra note 273.
315. See supra note 272.
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nification and defense).
B. An Adopted Rule - No New York Basis
Contrary to the majority's position that consideration of
facts extrinsic to the complaint had a basis in New York case
law, a close examination of the cited case law reveals that no
such basis existed. The majority cited two New York cases,
Commercial Pipes16 and Sucrest,17 as examples of cases that
have held that an insurer must consider extrinsic facts in its
duty to defend determination."'8 Neither case, however, stands
for that proposition.
In Commercial Pipe, the court held that the insurer had a
duty to defend its insured based on the facts alleged in the com-
plaint. 19 The court stated that the facts alleged in the com-
plaint plus facts reasonably inferred from the complaint lan-
guage were sufficient to bring the claim within the potential
coverage of the policy.32 0 In Sucrest, the court also found that
the insurer had a duty to defend and based its decision solely on
the complaint allegations.321 The court held that the insurer was
required to consider the allegations in a third-party complaint
served on its insured in addition to the allegations in the main
complaint.322 The court in Sucrest, therefore, only obligated the
insurer to look at complaint allegations - not extrinsic facts.32 3
Accordingly, prior to Fitzpatrick, New York case law did not re-
quire an insurer to look beyond the potentiality of complaint al-
legations when making its duty to defend determination.
316. 36 A.D.2d 412, 321 N.Y.S.2d 219 (4th Dep't 1971).
317. 83 Misc. 2d 394, 371 N.Y.S.2d 927 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
318. See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
319. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
320. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
321. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
322. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 87-97 and accompanying text.
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C. Implications Of Fitzpatrick
1. No New Duty To Investigate
The Fitzpatrick rule neither expressly calls for nor implies
a duty to investigate on the part of the insurer.2" The majority
adopted the rule from other jurisdictions where no duty to in-
vestigate has been imposed.3 25 The Fitzpatrick rule, reflecting
the rule existing in those jurisdictions, only requires an insurer
to consider extrinsic facts of which it has actual knowledge.32 6
The actual knowledge of the insurer is limited to knowledge of
the facts in the complaint and the facts made known to the in-
surer.2 7 Therefore, a duty to attempt to discover other facts
through investigation is not imposed on the insurer.
This distinction is readily apparent by examining the rule
that exists in other jurisdictions that do impose an affirmative
duty to investigate on the insurer. 28 In those jurisdictions, an
insurer is required to consider not only the facts it knows of but
also the facts that are reasonably ascertainable. 29 In other
words, the insurer is obligated to consider extrinsic facts it
knows of or should know of when it makes the duty to defend
determination.3 3 0 Thus, under this form of the rule, the insurer
has an affirmative duty to investigate to discover any extrinsic
facts that it should be aware of as a result of a reasonable
investigation.331
The dissent's concern, therefore, over a new implied duty to
investigate is ill-founded. 32 The Fitzpatrick rule restricts the
extrinsic facts that an insurer is required to consider to only
those facts brought to the attention of the insurer.3 83 Conse-
quently, in respect to investigation, the insurer does not have
any new duty under Fitzpatrick.
324. See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
325. See supra note 100.
326. See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
327. See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
328. See supra note 101.
329. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
330. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
332. See supra note 304 and accompanying text.
333. See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
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2. A New Subjective Test
The majority, in abandoning the four corners of the com-
plaint rule as the touchstone for determining when the insurer's
duty to defend is triggered, also abandoned the longstanding ob-
jective comparison test.33 4 Under the objective comparison test,
the insurer simply compared the allegations of the complaint
with the terms of the insurance policy.3 3 5 If the insurer deter-
mined that based on its review of the two documents that no
reasonable possibility of coverage existed, the inquiry ended and
the insurer was justified in denying an insurer-provided de-
fense. 3 6 If the insured disagreed with the insurer's interpreta-
tion, it could bring a declaratory judgment action against the in-
surer.8 7 In the declaratory judgment action, the court was only
required to compare the two documents in making its determi-
nation, as a matter of law, whether the insurer had a duty to
defend.3 38 This test was a practical, efficient tool to determine
whether the duty to defend existed.3
In contrast, the Fitzpatrick rule employs a subjective
test.3 0 The subjective nature of the test arises as the result of
the addition of the insurer's knowledge in the duty to defend
determination. The insurer must now consider those facts it has
actual knowledge of concerning the claim in addition to the alle-
gations of the complaint asserted against its insured. 41 There-
fore, an insurer is obligated to consider all oral and written alle-
gations concerning the claims that are brought to its
attention.42 Furthermore, in a declaratory judgment action
brought to determine the insurer's duty to defend, the court will
be obligated to look beyond the allegations in the complaint and
determine what the insurer "actually knew" of the claim.3 43 As
posited by the dissent, Fitzpatrick supplants the certainty of
334. See supra note 298 and accompanying text.
335. See supra notes 275-76, 296 and accompanying text.
336. See supra notes 119-26 and accompanying text.
337. See supra notes 162-70 and accompanying text.
338. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
339. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
340. See supra note 298 and accompanying text.
341. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
342. See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
343. See supra note 311 and accompanying text.
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the objective comparison test with the uncertainty of a subjec-
tive test." '
D. Fitzpatrick: The Missing Requirement
1. One Step Forward, A Half Step Back
The Fitzpatrick rule is a positive step that permits an in-
sured to enforce the contracted-for right of an insurer-provided
defense. The insured now has a voice in the duty to defend de-
termination that must be heard. The adoption of the new rule,
however, carries with it a new subjective test. 45
In contrast to the objective comparison test, the subjective
test is not a practical, efficient tool to determine whether the
duty to defend has been triggered. The insurer cannot simply
compare the documents before it and make its determination.
Under Fitzpatrick, the insurer must now consider any other in-
formation of which it has actual knowledge that concerns the
claim.3 46 This information can be from any source and may have
been transferred to the insurer in written or oral form. 47
Therefore, an insured can trigger the insurer's duty to de-
fend by oral assertions that place the claim within policy cover-
age. A concern of insurers is that under the new rule, an insured
can force an insurer-provided defense with mere self-serving as-
sertions that are in direct conflict with the complaint allega-
tions. 8  In this scenario, the insurer's duty to defend is held
hostage to the insured's assertions - to refuse would potentially
expose the insurer to breach of contract with its attendant
liability. 49
In addition, a declaratory judgment action brought by ei-
ther the insurer or the insured will be a more complicated pro-
ceeding.350 The court, in making its determination as a matter of
law whether the duty to defend has been triggered, will be obli-
344. See supra note 311 and accompanying text.
345. See supra notes 334-44 and accompanying text.
346. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
347. See supra notes 285-86 and accompanying text. The court in Fitzpatrick held
the insurer to have actual knowledge of facts extrinsic to the complaint based on the
insured's oral and written assertions.
348. See McNulty, supra note 216, at 18, 20.
349. See supra notes 141-60 and accompanying text.
350. See supra note 311 and accompanying text.
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gated to look beyond the complaint and make a factual inquiry
into what facts the insurer actually knew. Accordingly, the de-
claratory judgment action will no longer be the simple document
review procedure that existed under the four corners of the com-
plaint rule. Neither the parties to the action nor the court is well
served by the employment of an inefficient tool to determine the
insurer's duty to defend.
Furthermore, because insurers must now look beyond the
documents to all sources from which actual knowledge may be
gained, they may become increasingly uncertain about coverage
determinations.351 Insurers, knowing that the decision to deny
coverage is "at [their] own peril" 352 and that a wrong decision
will result in breach of contract damages and loss of control of
the suit,8 3 are likely to take preventative measures. Insurers will
probably make increased use of declaratory judgment actions
and reservation of rights agreements or notices.36 ' Moreover,
should insurers view the expansion of the duty to defend, from
an already expansive rule, as a sign of an approaching absolute
duty to defend, they may begin to make greater use of non-duty
to defend policies.3 55 In sum, the result may be that the insurer-
provided defense may become narrower rather than more
expansive.
2. A Solution
The simple, obvious solution to the problems created by the
subjective test is to return to an objective test. The reversion to
an objective test can be accomplished by only requiring the in-
surer to consider information extrinsic to the complaint of which
it has actual knowledge by sworn documents. 66 The result
would be to restore the certainty that existed under the pre-
Fitzpatrick rule, and to regain a practical, efficient tool to deter-
351. See McNulty, supra note 216, at 22.
352. See supra note 141.
353. See supra notes 141-60 and accompanying text.
354. See supra notes 162-93 and accompanying text.
355. See supra notes 194-211 and accompanying text.
356. This requirement would be similar to the type of documentation required
under a motion for summary judgment. See N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 3212(b), cmt.
c:3212:15 (McKinney 1991).
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mine the insurer's duty to defend.""
The addition of the document requirement brings the form
of the test back to the objective test of the four corners of the
complaint rule. The insurer would simply be obligated to review
the documents before it: the complaint, the policy and the ex-
trinsic fact document(s), when making its duty to defend deter-
mination. Because the insured is required to provide the insurer
with the extrinsic information, now in documentary form, the
insurer has no duty to investigate. 58 This requirement allows
the insurer greater certainty regarding what information it will
be deemed to have actual knowledge of. The insurer will only
need to look at the documents before it.
Consequently, the declaratory judgment action brought to
determine or review the insurer's duty to defend will also be
simplified. As under the former rule, the court will only be obli-
gated to review the documents before it - the same documents
that the insurer reviewed - when making its determination as
a matter of law whether the insurer's duty to defend was trig-
gered. Therefore, the extrinsic fact document requirement re-
sults in an objective test that is practical and efficient.
Moreover, the extrinsic fact documentation requirement ad-
dresses the insurer's concern over the insured's orally asserting
mere self-serving facts to trigger the insurer-provided defense. If
the insured willfully conceals or materially misrepresents facts
concerning the claim, the insurer has documentary proof to void
the policy under the cooperation clause of the policy.359 Accord-
ingly, the insured will be discouraged from making false factual
assertions merely to invoke the insurer-provided defense and the
defense duty will not be held hostage by the insured.
Therefore, under Fitzpatrick, with the added requirement
of extrinsic fact documentation, the procedure for the duty to
defend determination would start with the insurer's review of
the complaint and the policy; if this examination reveals a rea-
sonable possibility of coverage, the insurer must defend. If it
does not, the insurer must notify the insured of the initial re-
fusal to defend, and then inform the insured that if the actual
357. See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
358. See supra notes 324-33 and accompanying text.
359. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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facts differ from the facts alleged in the complaint, the insured
may provide the insurer with a sworn document setting forth the
actual facts. If this document is provided to the insurer, the in-
surer must then review the extrinsic fact document in conjunc-
tion with the complaint and the policy to determine if the duty
to defend has been triggered. This procedure, which incorpo-
rates the extrinsic fact documentation, provides for fairness, cer-
tainty and efficiency.
V. Conclusion
In New York, the four corners of the complaint rule no
longer serves as the established rule for determining the exis-
tence of the insurer's duty to defend its insured. Under Fitzpat-
rick, the insurer's duty to defend is triggered not only when the
facts in the complaint against the insured raise a reasonable pos-
sibility of coverage under the policy, but also when the insurer
has actual knowledge of facts extrinsic to the complaint that es-
tablish a reasonable possibility of coverage. Now, the insured's
right to an insurer-provided defense cannot be held hostage to
the facts that the plaintiff chooses to include in its complaint.
The Fitzpatrick rule, however, employs a subjective test
that serves neither the litigants nor the court well. Adoption of
the proposed extrinsic fact documentation requirement will re-
turn practicality, certainty, and efficiency to the duty to defend
determination while maintaining the just and equitable results
of Fitzpatrick.
Clifford A. Platt*
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